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Todd A. Berger 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer 
Redux: The New Three Hardest Questions 
Abstract.  In 1966, Professor Monroe Freedman authored Professional 
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, a work 
that occupies an important place in the cannon of legal ethics. Freedman 
believed that the three hardest questions facing a criminal defense attorney 
relate to whether it is ethical to discredit a truthful witness; whether it is 
proper to knowingly allow a client to testify falsely; and whether a lawyer may 
provide a client with legal advice when the lawyer suspects the client may use 
that advice to commit a crime. 
Beyond Freedman’s queries there are other important, yet largely 
unaddressed, ethical issues that feature prominently in the landscape of 
criminal defense representation. This Article identifies its own version of the 
“three hardest” ethical questions in the context of criminal defense practice, 
and proposes answers to these questions.   
These issues are: (1) what is the ethically appropriate response when a 
crime victim who does not wish to pursue prosecution asks a criminal defense 
attorney, “what happens if I don’t come to court?”; (2) what should defense 
counsel say to a judge who directly asks counsel about incriminating 
information that is protected by attorney–client confidentiality when the judge 
can easily infer that defense counsel’s refusal to answer is an indication of the 
client’s guilt; and (3) can defense counsel zealously advocate for an individual 
client if doing so would potentially anger a prosecutor who is likely to retaliate 
by punishing the attorney’s other clients? 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1966, Professor Monroe Freedman authored Professional Responsibility 
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, a work that 
occupies an important place in the cannon of contemporary legal ethics.1  
Freedman suggested that the three hardest questions facing a criminal 
defense attorney are the following: (1) is it ethical to discredit a truthful 
witness; (2) is it proper to knowingly put a witness on the stand who will 
commit perjury; and (3) may a lawyer provide a client with legal advice 
 
 1.  See William H. Simon, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” About Ethical Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1, 1 (1998) (stating the following with regards to the importance of Freedman’s article, “[s]uppose 
you had to pick the two most influential events in the recent emergence of ethics as a subject of 
serious reflection by the bar.  Most likely, you would name the Watergate affair of 1974 and the 
appearance a few years earlier of an article by Monroe Freedman.  The article was a discussion of 
what Freedman called the ‘Three Hardest Questions’ surrounding the responsibilities of criminal 
defense lawyers.”) (citing Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) [hereinafter Freedman, The Three Hardest 
Questions]).  Interestingly, the Freedman article sparked enormous controversy and some of 
Freedman’s proposed answers “even led Warren Burger, then a federal appellate court judge, to 
initiate professional disciplinary proceedings against Freedman.”  See Abbe Smith, Defending: The Case 
for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 957–58 n.158 
(2000) (emphasizing the importance of zealous advocacy in a criminal defense practice). 
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when the lawyer suspects the client may use that advice to commit 
perjury?2  Since the publication of The Three Hardest Questions, legal scholars 
have devoted a substantial amount of scholarly attention to these particular 
topics.3 
To the extent that legal ethicists have addressed other ethical dilemmas 
in the practice of criminal law, a significant amount of focus has been 
trained on topics relating to witness coaching,4 the destruction of 
evidence,5 conflicts of interest,6 attorneys’ fees,7 trial publicity, and public 
statements.8  Legal commentators have also addressed other ethical 
concerns that occur in criminal defense practice, including issues such as 
the use of preemptory challenges on the basis of race and the classic, 
“How can you defend those people?” (although the latter question may be 
characterized as relating more to general moral concerns as opposed to 
how to conduct oneself in accordance with relevant ethical rules).9 
The above topics are obviously worthy of discussion and present their 
own set of ethical difficulties.  Nevertheless, limited attention has been 
 
 2.  Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).  
 3.  See David S. Rubenstein, Remembering Monroe, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, July–Aug. 2015, at 14, 14 n.3 
(noting “[t]o this day, Freedman’s canonical article is one of the most—if not the most—widely cited 
article on legal ethics ever”).  
 4.  See generally James Farragher Campbell, Ethical Concerns in Grooming the Criminal Defendant for the 
Witness Stand, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 265, 265 (2007) (“How a defendant delivers his testimony is often 
as crucial as what he testifies to.  How does defense counsel go about preparing her client for the 
witness stand?”); Roberta K. Flowers, Witness Preparation: Regulating the Profession’s “Dirty Little Secret,” 
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1007–08 (2011) (discussing the ethical constraints on witness preparation 
in trial advocacy).  
 5.  See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE 
PERVASIVE METHOD 595–621 (2d ed. 1998) (describing the methodology employed by criminal 
attorneys when undercutting damaging evidence); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Physical Evidence Dilemma: 
Does ABA Standard 4-4.6 Offer Appropriate Guidance?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1177, 1181–82 (2011) 
(analyzing the difficulties practitioners often face with the treatment of potentially incriminating 
physical evidence).  
 6.  See generally JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS (2d ed. 2016) (addressing the 
topics of conflicts of interest, attorneys’ fees, and trial publicity in substantial detail over several 
chapters). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  See Tim Kiefer, Real Lawyers by Kenneth Farmer WIS. LAW., Mar. 2015 (book review) 
(discussing the issues that affect defense attorneys).  See generally Brent E. Newton, “How Can You 
Defend a Person You Know Is Guilty?”: Reflections of a Public Defender, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 167 (2009) 
(recounting a prosecutor who used peremptory strikes to remove the African-Americans in the jury 
pool, and, in closing argument stated ‘“we have been concerning ourselves with the civil rights of the 
defendant for the past twenty years . . . and it’s time we started thinking about the civil rights of the 
victims’”). 
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devoted to addressing other important ethical issues that feature 
prominently in the landscape of criminal defense representation.  These 
other largely unaddressed ethical dilemmas are not only frequently 
encountered by criminal defense attorneys in courtrooms across the 
country, they also pose questions of substantial ethical complexity.  To 
that end, this Article identifies its own newer version of the “three 
hardest” ethical questions in the context of criminal defense practice.10 
The issues this Article intends to shed light on are as follows: 
(1) What is the ethically appropriate response when a victim of a 
crime who does not wish to pursue prosecution asks a criminal 
defense attorney, “So, what happens if I don’t come to court?” 
(2) What should defense counsel say to a judge who directly asks 
counsel about incriminating information that is protected by 
attorney–client confidentiality when the judge can easily infer that 
defense counsel’s refusal to answer such a question is an indication of 
the client’s culpability? 
(3) Can defense counsel zealously advocate for an individual client if 
doing so would potentially anger a prosecutor who is likely to retaliate 
by punishing the attorney’s other clients? 
The purpose of this work is to provide meaningful guidance to those 
criminal defense attorneys who encounter these particular ethical 
dilemmas.11 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I addresses the definitional 
matter of what it means for a particular ethical question to be considered 
 
 10.  I do not suggest the three issues identified by this Article as the new “three hardest 
questions” are literally the three hardest ethical questions attorneys face.  There are many hard, 
ethical questions and it is impossible to say which three are the hardest.  See Part I below detailing 
how this work defines a “hard” ethical question. 
 11.  In addition to legal scholarship, it is not clear that this Article’s version of the three hardest 
questions receives much attention in law school professional responsibility classes.  See Leah 
Wortham, Teaching Professional Responsibility in Law School, DEL. LAW., Dec. 1993, at 18, 19 (explaining 
that in ten years of teaching professional responsibility, Professor Wortham devotes three or four 
hours each semester “to some issues unique to criminal practice—duties regarding physical evidence 
that could be termed a fruit or instrumentality of the crime, legal ethics in plea bargaining, and 
prosecutorial conduct”).  Of course, any particular professional responsibility class could address this 
Article’s version of the three hardest questions and it may be that other classes, such as law school 
criminal defense clinics, may address these questions as well.  Certainly, this Article’s version of the 
three hardest questions are topics that frequently present themselves in the course of supervising my 
clinic students and also comprise a portion of the material covered in the seminar portion of the 
class.  
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“hard” or complicated.  In addressing this question, to some extent, this 
Article re-frames Freedman’s understanding of this particular issue.  Parts 
II through IV individually explore the ethical dimensions related to each of 
the above three questions.  In so doing, this Article proposes workable 
responses and solutions to the new three hardest questions primarily, but 
not exclusively, from the perspective of the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the primary source of law 
that regulates the legal profession. 
I. DEFINING A “HARD” ETHICAL QUESTION 
Before turning to this Article’s version of the three hardest questions, it 
is of course necessary to define what is meant by a “hard” ethical question 
in the first place.  In answering this question, this Article has adopted its 
own working definition of what constitutes a hard ethical question.  To 
that end, this Article’s understanding of what makes for a “hard” ethical 
question departs somewhat from the definitional framework adopted by 
Freedman. 
Simply put, this work defines a “hard” ethical question from the 
perspective of compliance with formal ethics rules, as opposed to 
Freedman’s approach which focused more on competing moral values. 
A. Defining “Hard” Ethical Questions by Adopting a Rules-Based Approach 
When Freedman explored the three hardest questions, there was “no 
professional consensus on their resolution.”12  Indeed, at the time of 
Freedman’s 1966 writing, the ethics rules then in effect consisted of the 
1908 American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics.13  These 
cannons provided no clear answers to his ethical queries.14 
Not surprisingly then, Freedman did not view the question of what 
constitutes a “hard” ethical question from the perspective of determining 
the meaning of a particular ethics rule.  Rather, in his view, a “hard” 
question  
 
arises where any answer to that question permits a lawyer to pursue a moral 
value but also requires another moral value to be sacrificed.  The question is 
hard because it places moral values in irreducible conflict.  The lawyer has 
 
 12.  Bruce A. Green, Candor in Criminal Advocacy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (2016). 
 13.  Id at 1106. 
 14.  Id. 
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no unambiguous response, morally speaking; whatever she chooses, she will 
do both right and wrong.15 
 
In the years after Freedman wrote The Three Hardest Questions, the 
construction of formal ethics rules eventually moved beyond the 1908 
Canons of Professional Ethics.16  Nevertheless, Freedman disagreed with those 
who saw ethical problems as capable of being resolved entirely through the 
application of a particular rule.17  In Freedman’s view, “a rule produced a 
result, but it did so at the cost of evading the nature of the ethical problem 
it supposedly resolved.”18 
However, for the purposes of this Article, I have chosen not to identify 
the difficulty of an ethical dilemma by determining the moral value of a 
particular lawyer’s response.  Instead, I have chosen to define the difficulty 
of a particular ethical challenge by examining how a lawyer should respond 
in light of relevant ethics rules and guidelines—not abstract morals.  To 
that end, legal ethics rules are not the same as moral pronouncements.  As 
commentators have long recognized, ethics rules are written with respect 
to the values that are expected of “good lawyers” and not necessarily 
“good people.”19  Professor Fred C. Zacharias has even referred to formal 
 
 15.  Alice Woolley, Hard Questions and Innocent Clients: The Normative Framework of the Three Hardest 
Questions, and the Plea Bargaining Problem, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1179–80 (2016) (footnote 
omitted).  This is not to suggest that Freedman’s view of attorney ethics was entirely theoretical and 
without grounding in the law itself.  Freedman’s view of legal ethics produced “a new client-centered 
paradigm for thinking about the relative roles of lawyers, clients, and courts in an adversarial system,” 
and this new paradigm found legal support in Freedman’s view of the Constitution.  See Rubenstein, 
supra note 3, at 14.  To that end, Freedman’s basic premise was that the American adversarial legal 
system is rooted in the Bill of Rights and exists principally to affirm the human dignity of each 
individual.  See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 13, 
26 (3d ed. 2004) (listing several cases in which the ability to litigate a claim is fundamental in the Bill 
of Rights).    
 16.  Following the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, in 1969 the ABA adopted the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility.  About the Model Rules, AM. B. ASS’N http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2017).  “The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA 
House of Delegates in 1983.”  Id.  For a history of the evolution of ABA ethics codes, see id.   
 17.  Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Civil Practitioner: Teaching Legal Ethics in 
the Contracts Course, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 578 (1969) (“[T]hese issues do not appear to have been 
settled satisfactorily by the Canons of Professional Ethics.  Indeed, several problems seem in fact to 
be created, or at least to be brought into sharper focus, by self-contradictions in the Canons 
themselves.”). 
 18.  Woolley, supra note 15, at 1184 (citing Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the 
Civil Practitioner: Teaching Legal Ethics in the Contracts Course, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 578 (1969)). 
 19.  Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm 
of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 227–28 (1993). 
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ethics rules as “morally neutral.”20 
Nevertheless, this Article’s version of what constitutes a “hard” ethical 
question does bear some similarity to Freedman’s point of view.  
Freedman’s characterization of a hard ethical question involves an 
“irreducible conflict” between competing moral values.21  This Article’s 
rendition of the three hardest questions also recognizes that hard ethical 
questions raise the potential for an “irreducible conflict.” 
In this regard, a hard ethical question from the perspective of a rules-
based analysis falls into one of two categories.  Either, (1) a particular 
ethical dilemma represents a conflict between competing ethics rules and 
regulations (questions one and two of this Article) or (2) an irreducible 
conflict exists between the literal dictates of the relevant ethics rule and the 
practical concerns that make it difficult for an attorney to follow those 
dictates in the real world practice of law (this Article’s third question). 
1. The Value of a Rules-Based Approach to Defining Hard Ethical 
Questions 
As noted above, ethics codes have gradually evolved into more detailed 
documents over time.  Moving beyond the 1908 Cannons, under the 
direction of then-ABA President and later Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., in 1969, the ABA created the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility.22  Eventually, the Code of Professional Responsibility was 
replaced in 1983 with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
Model Rules).23 
The Model Rules have been adopted, at least in part, as the formal 
ethics rules by every state in the country, with the exception of 
California.24  It is for this reason that the Model Rules are the most 
 
 20.  Id. at 228.  
 21.  Woolley, supra note 15, at 1179 (characterizing the dilemma attorneys face between doing 
what is right as opposed to what is best for their client).  
 22.  Louis Parley, A Brief History of Legal Ethics, 33 FAM. L.Q. 637, 639 (1999). 
 23.  Id. at 640; see also About the Model Rules, supra note 16 (“Before the adoption of the Model 
Rules, the ABA Model was the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  Preceding the 
Model Code were the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics . . . .”).  
 24.  State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_prof
essional_conduct.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2017) (providing a history of the evolution of ABA ethics 
codes).  Attorney conduct in California is regulated by a separate ethics code called the California 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  See generally CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (West 2015) 
(providing a unique code of ethics for the lawyers of the California Bar).  While not formally adopted 
by the State of California, California courts may look at ABA Model Rules for guidance “when 
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important set of ethics rules that regulate attorney conduct. 
Indeed, Professor Cecelia Klingele has stated that the most influential 
source of guidance for attorney conduct “will be the rules of professional 
conduct that govern the behavior of lawyers within a specified jurisdiction: 
Because breach may result in professional sanction, lawyers are likely to 
pay close attention to the content of these rules.”25  In fact, the Model 
Rules have been referred to as “quasi-criminal” in nature.26 
Accordingly, in the world in which criminal defense attorneys practice, 
ethical dilemmas are not viewed from the perspective of a particular moral 
quandary.  Rather, for practicing attorneys, questions of legal ethics are 
likely defined by the “statute like” regulations that govern the profession. 
In light of this realization, I have chosen to explore my version of the 
three hardest questions from the perspective of formal ethics rules.  To 
that end, this work will principally address these three questions from the 
perspective of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as the 
Model Rules are the primary source of law that regulates the legal 
profession.27 
It should be noted that while this Article’s stated purpose is to provide 
rules-based guidance with respect to its three particular ethical questions, 
doing so is at times complicated by the ambiguity of ethics rules and the 
 
California does not have an ethical rule governing a specific issue.”  San Diego Cty. Bar Ass’n, Legal 
Ethics Op. 2011-1. 
 25.  Cecelia Klingele, Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New ABA Criminal Justice Standards 
(Don’t) Say About the Duties of Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 983, 984–85 (2011).  
 26.  John W. Allen, Protecting the Privilege—MRPC 3.4(g) is NOT the Way, MICH. B.J., Nov. 2006, 
at 48, 49. 
 27.  See About the Model Rules, supra note 16 (“[The Rules] serve as models for the ethics rules of 
most states.”).  In addition to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, there are two other 
influential sources of ethical guidance for criminal defense attorneys.  These are the ABA’s Criminal 
Justice Standards and American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.  The 
ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards have no legal authority unless adopted by a court or legislature.  Rory 
K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 
62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011).  While generally non-binding, the Criminal Justice Standards 
function as a potentially influential source of guidance in terms of defining the ethical limitations of 
attorney conduct.  Klingele, supra note 25, at 985.  While also non-binding, another source of ethical 
guidance comes from the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.  The primary goal of the 
Restatement is not to supplant ABA ethics guidelines, but to complement them.  The Restatement 
therefore is influenced not only by ABA ethics rules, but also by decisional law and other statutory 
text.  Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 
26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 712 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS proposed final draft no. 1, at xxxvi (AM. LAW INST. 1996)).  While this work is primarily 
focused on the ABA’s Rule of Model Conduct, it should be noted that neither the Criminal Justice 
Standards nor the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers contradicts the Model Rules that are 
referenced as part of the proceeding analysis.  
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fact that a determination regarding ethical conduct is subject to a 
seemingly infinite number of factual variations.28 
As a result, this Article cannot always provide rules-based ethical 
guidance in terms of absolute dictates (this is particularly true with respect 
to questions one and two).  Indeed, an attorney practicing in the real world 
may occasionally find herself faced with an ethical quandary in which her 
view of the most ethically appropriate course of action may inevitably boil 
down to her individual interpretation of a given rule coupled with her 
willingness to push ethical boundaries. 
However, regardless of the fact that ethics rules can be ambiguous and 
ethical or unethical behavior can turn on slight factual variances, a rules-
based approach to exploring ethical complexities has value.  Indeed, 
despite these particular shortcomings, because lawyers practice in a rules-
based world, “lawyers are likely to pay close attention to the content of 
these rules.”29  In light of this observation, as stated previously, the 
purpose of this Article is to identify and, to the extent possible, provide 
concrete rules-based guidance to those attorneys who must attempt to 
navigate through the ethical minefields that are this Article’s three hardest 
questions.30 
 
 28.  Abraham Dash, Lawyer-Client Privilege—Exceptions Swallowing the Principle?, MD. B.J., 
Mar./Apr. 2011, at 46, 46 ( “[T]he American Bar Committee and the various state bar committees 
that fashioned the Rules of Professional Conduct dealt with complex ethical issues that are difficult 
to find practical answers for, under the many different factual situations that can arise.”).  Therefore, 
the language of any given ethics rule often times reflects numerous philosophical and practical 
differences of opinion.  Id.  In light of the above, it is not surprising that the ethical rules written by 
committees are often times ambiguous and unclear.  Id. at 49.  
 29.  Klingele, supra note 25, at 984–85 (2011).   
 30.  It should be acknowledged that a rules-based approach to addressing ethical issues is not 
the most effective way to create a just society.  Again, legal ethics rules and moral values are not 
necessarily the same.  Zacharias, supra note 19, at 227–28.  Certainly, it is not always clear that the 
answer to a particular ethical challenge, as provided for in a formal ethics regulation, is the most 
normatively appropriate way in which to create a more moral version of the practice of law.  See 
Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CALIF. L. 
REV. 885, 886 (1996) (calling a rule-based approach to ethical analysis “technocratic lawyering” and 
positing that “this mode of lawyering discourages, and may even entirely thwart, a certain sentimental 
responsiveness integral to genuine ethical deliberation”); see also Michael Ambrosio, Reflections on the 
Appearance of Impropriety Standard, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2011, at 5, 10 (commenting on the work of 
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg and suggesting a legalistic adherence to rules may ultimately prevent 
one from recognizing the rights and values that are necessary for the formation of a good society and 
to achieve justice).  Additionally, this work does not take a position with respect to whether certain 
ethics rules are consistent with the various goals that comprise the American criminal justice system 
(such goals include finding the truth, “respecting individual dignity, equal justice, and maintenance of 
an accusatorial system”).  David A. Harris, The Constitution and the Truth Seeking: A New Theory on 
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 494–99 (1992).  
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II.    QUESTION # 1 (WHAT IS THE ETHICALLY APPROPRIATE RESPONSE 
WHEN A VICTIM OF A CRIME WHO DOES NOT WISH TO PURSUE 
PROSECUTION ASKS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY, 
“SO, WHAT HAPPENS IF I DON’T COME TO COURT?”) 
A. The Factual Scenario 
Often times—and especially in domestic violence cases, where the 
parties frequently reconcile—a complainant decides that she wants to drop 
the charges.  Perhaps the defendant is truly guilty, but the victim does not 
want to see him go to jail, either for financial reasons or otherwise.  
Perhaps the complainant and victim have worked to resolve whatever 
underlying issue led to the criminal case and all is forgiven.  Perhaps the 
complainant simply lied to the police to get the defendant arrested for 
some reason.  Regardless, she no longer wishes to go forward. 
However, the complainant is unable to get in touch with the district 
attorney handling the case.  The district attorney was either too busy to 
talk to her, or never called her back, or the district attorney’s voicemail was 
full. 
Or, perhaps the complainant spoke with the district attorney and was 
told she could not drop the case.  Often, witnesses think they can simply 
tell the prosecution they “don’t want to press charges” and the case will go 
away.  After all, that is how things work on television.  However, in the 
real world it is the prosecution who decides, even over the complainant’s 
objection, whether or not a case goes to trial.31 
 
 Certainly, questions relating to whether the rules-based answers this Article provides are morally 
correct, or effectively promote the goals of the American criminal justice system, are questions 
worthy of debate.  However, providing an answer to such questions is not this Article’s intended 
purpose.  In this sense, the exploration of such issues is indeed beyond the scope of this particular 
work.  While this Article explores the answer to these questions under current ethics rules, future 
works can explore the normative value of these answers and, if necessary, propose changes that take 
into account broader questions of morality and the norms of the criminal justice process.  
 31.  In domestic violence cases this is referred to as a “no-drop” statute or policy.  Leigh 
Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for 
Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV 7, 16 (2004) (defining a “no-drop” policy as one in 
which “decisions to pursue a domestic violence case would be made by the government, not the 
victim”).  The following Florida statute is an example of a “no-drop” statute:  
It is the intent of the Legislature that domestic violence be treated as a criminal act rather than a 
private matter . . . .  The filing, nonfiling, or diversion of criminal charges . . . shall be 
determined by . . . specialized prosecutors over the objection of the victim, if necessary.   
FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(2) (2017); see also Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-
302 (1997) (noting “it is the legal prerogative of the prosecutor to determine whether to prosecute or 
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Out of frustration, and in an attempt to resolve the matter in the 
manner that both the complainant and obviously the accused desire, the 
complainant will approach the defense attorney.  This may happen in 
court, the complainant may come to the defense attorney’s office, or the 
complainant may reach the defense attorney by phone.  After the defense 
attorney discusses the case with the complainant and explains to her why 
she cannot simply drop the charges, the complainant usually asks 
something to the effect of, “So what happens if I don’t come to court?” 
When confronted with this situation, how can an attorney best 
represent her client and at the same time do so in compliance with 
governing ethics rules?32  Simply put, what can an attorney say, and what 
should an attorney say, when the complainant asks such a question? 
Indeed, in answering this question, an attorney is necessarily required to 
navigate several different ethics rules, each of which regulate attorney 
conduct in its own unique way.  There are certainly some answers to the 
ethical dilemma addressed in this Part that are clearly in compliance with 
ethics rules.  Yet, there are also potential answers whose legality is subject 
to debate.  This is due in large part to the ambiguity of certain ethics rules 
and the lack of guidance in the form of ethics opinions or decisional law 
interpreting these rules. 
As will be seen below, the ethical boundaries related to how an attorney 
may respond when the complainant asks her, “What happens if I don’t 
come to court?” depends in large part on each individual attorney’s 
interpretation of the law and willingness to push ethical boundaries. 
 
not, not the complainant”).   
 32.  It should be noted that for the purposes of addressing all of this Article’s ethical questions, 
specific Model Rules will be examined.  However, Model Rule 8.4(a) contains a catch-all provision 
that reads, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
Therefore, any specific violation of a model rule detailed in this Article would necessarily violate 
Model Rule 8.4(a).  With respect to the question specific to this particular portion of the Article, 
obviously, other legal issues may arise when a complainant expresses her desire not to come to 
pursue charges.  If the complainant informed the prosecutor of this intent, and depending upon what 
was said, the prosecutor may have an obligation to pass favorable and material evidence pursuant to 
Brady v. Maryland.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1983) (holding an accused’s due process 
rights are violated when the prosecution withholds favorable evidence upon request from defense 
counsel).  Further, if the complainant admits that she fabricated the story, this may raise questions 
relating to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and whether the prosecution should 
initiate charges for making a false police report.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall [any person] 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).  That being said, this work is 
focused only on addressing the question of an attorney’s compliance with formal ethics rules. 
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B. The Ethical Response 
1. The Complainant Is Not a Represented Party 
Before moving on, it is first necessary to make clear that it is well within 
existing ethical boundaries for defense counsel to have a conversation with 
the complaining witness in a criminal matter.33 
To that end, the complaining witness in a criminal matter is not 
considered a represented party, unless she has retained her own attorney.34  
In other words, the government is the true complainant, and the 
complaining witness is really just a witness for the government.35 
Therefore, it is plainly ethical to speak with the complainant without 
violating Model Rule 4.2 which provides that attorneys may “not 
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the 
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law 
or a court order.”36  Simply put, not only is it ethical for defense counsel 
to speak with the complaining witness, because the witness is not 
considered a represented party, defense counsel is not required to ask the 
prosecutor’s permission to do so. 
 
      33. See Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-302 (1997) (explaining it is 
ethically permissible for a defense attorney to communicate “with a complaining witness without 
notice to or consent of the prosecutor”). 
 34.  In addressing whether a criminal defense attorney engages in misconduct for 
communicating with the complainant without providing the prosecutor notice, it has been said  
[t]he prosecutor is not the agent of the complaining witness as would be the case if a lawyer-
client relation existed. As noted above, the prosecutor is not bound to move to dismiss the case 
at the request of the complaining witness, as would be the case if the prosecutor represented the 
complaining witness as a client.  Thus, a criminal defense attorney does not violate MRPC 4.2 
by initiating an ex parte interview with a complaining witness without notice or consent of the 
prosecutor. 
Id.   
 35.  Id. 
 36.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also N.Y. St. Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 245 (1972) (“A lawyer may properly interview any witness or 
prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the consent of the 
opposing counsel or party, as a witness does not ‘belong’ to any party.”).  Further, it is ethically 
permissible for defense counsel to contact the complaining witness even if the defendant herself is 
the subject of a court order that prohibits contact with the complainant.  See Op. S.C. Att’y Gen. 
(S.C.A.G. June 2, 2015) 2015 WL 3636394, at *8 (opining it is not unethical for a defense attorney to 
contact a victim in a case because it is part of the defense attorney carrying out reasonable diligence 
in defending his or her client).  
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2. The Ethically Obvious Answers 
a. The Requirement of Diligent (Zealous) Advocacy 
Although defense counsel may obviously speak with a complaining 
witness without first getting the prosecutor’s permission, defense counsel 
must still adhere to the legal boundaries created by formal ethics rules.  
Moreover, when speaking with the witness, defense counsel also has 
certain ethical obligations with respect to representation of her own client. 
Recognizing that defense counsel has ethical obligations with respect to 
her own client, it is important to note that Model Rule 1.3 provides a 
lawyer has an overarching responsibility to “act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client.”37  This rule is sometimes 
referred as the duty to zealously advocate for one’s client.  The drafters of 
the Model Rules chose not to incorporate this language into its 
formulation of Rule 1.3, although such language previously existed in 
Cannon 7 of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.38  However, 
it is common practice for attorneys to speak of their obligation to 
zealously represent their clients because the Model Rules have certainly not 
abandoned the concept of zealous advocacy.39  In fact, “five references 
are made to the concept of zeal in the preamble, commentary and 
background material within the overall text of” the Model Rules.40 
Model Rule 1.3 is important to the current discussion in that it requires 
that defense counsel’s response to the complainant’s inquiry comply with 
diligent/zealous advocacy in aiding the client’s cause.41  Indeed, zealous 
advocacy is “especially important in the context of criminal defense, where 
the client’s liberty interest is at stake.”42 
 
        37.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 38.  See George A. Riemer, Zealous Lawyers Saints or Sinners?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1998, at 31, 
31–32 (1988) (acknowledging the historical lineage and derivation of the concept of zealous 
advocacy, despite its absence from the current Model Rules); see also Paul C. Saunders, Whatever 
Happened to ‘Zealous Advocacy’?, 245 N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 11, 2011) (“[T]he word ‘zeal’ was removed from 
the only place it appeared in the proposed new rules, the Comment to Rule 1.3.”).  
 39.  See Riemer, supra note 38, at 31–32 (“[W]e should not water down one of the core duties of 
lawyers: to be zealous advocates on behalf of their clients.”); see also Saunders, supra note 38 
(“‘Zealous advocacy’ is what clients expect, and it is what they deserve.”). 
 40.  Riemer, supra note 38, at 32. 
        41.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 42.  Herman J.F. Hoying, To File or Not to File: The Practical and Ethical Implications of Motion Practice 
on Sentence Negotiations in Capital Cases, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 49, 49 (2002) (first citing ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-1.2(b) (3d ed. 
1992); and then citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725–26 (1948)).   
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Assume that defense counsel were to respond to the complainant by 
saying, “You’re saying my client did a bad thing.  I think it might be a good idea for 
you to come to court and testify.  That way, he might get convicted and put in jail and 
you will not have to worry about him anymore.” 
One would be hard pressed to make the case that such a response is 
consistent with the comment to Rule 1.3, which provides that a “lawyer 
must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client 
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”43  Indeed, one 
imagines that few criminal defense attorneys actually respond in such a 
manner, recognizing that such a response does not reflect the type of 
advocacy mandated by Rule 1.3. 
However, if the above response constitutes too little advocacy, at what 
point may defense counsel’s response constitute too much advocacy?  Or 
said another way, is there a way in which defense counsel may answer the 
complainant’s questions that is violative of the boundaries established by 
current ethical regulations?  This question is addressed below. 
b. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel 
In the above example, defense counsel clearly does little to advance his 
client’s interests by actively encouraging the witness to come to court and 
testify against his client, thereby increasing the chances of a conviction.  If 
such a response does not meet the requirement of zealous advocacy, 
would defense counsel have behaved ethically if she had said, “If you don’t 
want the case to move forward, don’t come to court; just ignore the prosecutor or any 
court issued subpoenas you happen to receive,” (or some variation of affirmatively 
telling the witness not to testify for the government)? 
In answering this question, it is important to take note of Model Rule 
3.4(a), which addresses fairness to opposing parties and counsel, and reads 
in relevant part, “[a] lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence.”44  An ethics opinion authored by the Pennsylvania 
Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility concluded, quite obviously, that affirmatively telling a 
witness not to testify on behalf of the prosecution violates Rule 3.4.45  
 
 43.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 44.  Id. r. 3.4(a).  
 45.  See Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 98-134 (1999) 
(responding to defense counsel’s question regarding whether it was proper to interview the 
complaining witness concerning the facts of the case and stating “[p]rovided you did not attempt to 
tell the witnesses not to testify for the Commonwealth, it appears your contact with them was 
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Indeed, conveying this information to the witness would unethically 
restrict another party’s access to evidence, as the prosecution has the right 
to present this witness’s testimony at trial.46  This answer seems easy 
enough. 
3. The Ethically Ambiguous (and the Most Common) Response 
The two sections above have made clear that the defense counsel owes 
the client a duty of zealous advocacy, but that there are limits to how far 
defense counsel may go when advocating on her client’s behalf. 
However, it is unlikely that most criminal defense attorneys would 
respond in the same manner as the hypothetical advocate described in 
Part II(B)(2)(a) and abandon all pretense of zealous advocacy on the 
client’s behalf.  Nor is it likely that most criminal defense attorneys would 
affirmatively tell a complainant that she should not come to court, as in 
Part II(B)(2)(b). 
In all likelihood, most defense attorneys will respond to the 
complainant’s inquiry regarding the consequences of not coming to court 
by making a statement that is somewhere between the two extremes 
identified above, i.e., telling the witness she should come to court to 
prosecute your client or she should not come to court at all. 
In this regard, the question becomes the following: How may an 
attorney respond to the complainant’s inquiry regarding the consequences 
of not coming to court that is acceptable under prevailing ethics rules?  
Said differently, what type of advocacy is not too little, not too much, but 
just right? 
A criminal defense attorney in Washington D.C. attempted to answer 
 
ethically proper”).   It should be noted that the opinions of state and local ethics committees, in many 
jurisdictions, are purely advisory.  See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More 
Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 318 (2002) (observing “most 
state and local published ethics opinions are advisory in nature”) (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, as 
noted by Professor Peter A. Joy, the opinions are important for several reasons: 
[F]irst, ethics opinions serve as a source of guidance for lawyers uncertain about their ethical 
responsibilities.  Second, in a significant number of jurisdictions, ethics opinions are either 
binding upon or serve as some authority for disciplinary bodies and courts interpreting duties 
created by ethical rules.  Third, federal and state court judges rely on state and local ethics 
opinions when resolving cases and controversies with legal ethics dimensions.  Fourth, these 
ethics opinions serve as a source of bargaining leverage in negotiations between lawyers, 
between lawyers and their employers, and between lawyers and their clients. 
Id. 
        46.  Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Op. 98-134 at 1 (1999).   
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this question by noting with specificity his two-part response when a 
complainant asks, “[w]hat would happen, . . . if I simply failed to show up 
for court?”47 
I . . . deliver some version of the spiel I was taught as a public defender: A 
subpoena is a court order.  If you disobey the subpoena, the court could 
issue a warrant for your arrest.  I am an officer of the court.  I cannot advise 
you to ignore the subpoena.  You should contact the prosecutor. 
If pressed, I will concede that, depending on the facts of the case, it could 
be difficult for the government to make its case against the defendant 
without the complaining witness’ testimony and that the chances of the 
court actually issuing the warrant, at least in most jurisdictions, is very small.  
But, again, I cannot advise you to ignore the subpoena.  That would have to 
be your decision.48 
Obviously, any given attorney may answer this question differently, alter 
words and phrases, use part of the above answer, none of it, or all of it.  
Nevertheless, I believe, based on my experience as a criminal defense 
attorney, that the above attorney’s response represents a fairly close 
approximation of how many criminal defense attorneys may respond when 
they find themselves confronted with this particular question.49 
It is for this reason that this work will address whether the above 
response is ethically appropriate (recognizing some variations of the 
response as described below).  Indeed, a determination of whether the 
above response complies with existing ethics rules is particularly relevant 
for the many attorneys who likely respond in a similar manner. 
In this regard, whether the Washington D.C. defense attorney’s 
response is ethically acceptable depends in large part on how one 
 
 47.  See Jamison Koehler, When the Complaining Witness Refuses to Testify in a Domestic Violence Case, 
KOEHLER L. (Aug. 11, 2010), http://koehlerlaw.net/2010/08/when-the-complaining-witness-
refuses-to-testify-in-a-domestic-violence-case/.  This particular blog posting indicates the frequency 
with which this particular ethical dilemma manifests itself in criminal trial practice, as well as the lack 
of scholarly guidance that exists with respect to this question.  As the comments section of this blog 
posting indicates, not only do many attorneys encounter this particular ethical dilemma, they are 
frequently left to ruminate on the answers to this question without more formal guidance.  See id. 
(revealing several comments similar to the underlying question but varying factual scenarios).  
 48.  Id.   
 49.  My practice experience includes close to seven years as a public defender in Philadelphia, 
another two years providing prisoner reentry legal services at the Rutgers School of Law-Camden 
Federal Prisoner Reentry Project, and close to five years as the Director of the Criminal Defense 
Clinic at the Syracuse University College of Law.   
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interprets Model Rule 4.3 which addresses communications with 
unrepresented parties,50 as well as the criminal prohibition against witness 
tampering.  These issues are explored below.51 
a. Rule 4.3: Giving Legal Advice to Adverse Unrepresented 
Parties 
Model Rule 4.3 provides that when communicating on behalf of a client 
with a person who is not represented by counsel, “a lawyer shall not state 
or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.”52  Further, and of particular 
importance, this rule notes in relevant part that, “[t]he lawyer shall not give 
legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure 
counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests 
of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict 
with the interests of the client.”53 
First, for the purposes of determining whether the defense attorney’s 
response is ethically appropriate, it is assumed the complainant knows, 
hopefully because this fact was communicated to her directly by defense 
counsel, that the attorney does not represent her and instead represents 
the defendant. 
Second, it is important to note that beyond the requirement that a 
lawyer not state or imply that she is disinterested, Model Rule 4.3 can be 
broken down into two component parts, each of which must be satisfied 
for a violation of the rule to have occurred.  The first part makes clear an 
ethical violation occurs only when the lawyer gives an unrepresented party 
legal advice.54  The second part of Model Rule 4.3 provides that even if 
the lawyer gives an unrepresented party legal advice, the lawyer has 
committed an ethical violation only when the parties’ interests are in 
conflict with one another.55 
 
 50.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
        51.  As noted above, I view the Washington D.C. defense attorney’s statement as a fairly typical 
example of the response given by many criminal defense attorneys when answering a complainant’s 
question regarding the consequences of not appearing in court.  As the proceeding Part 
demonstrates, the lawfulness of the attorney’s proffered response is subject to meaningful debate and 
does not lend itself to obvious clarity.  Consequently, it should be noted that I am not suggesting that 
the particular attorney whose response is addressed here has engaged in wrongdoing of any kind. 
        52.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 53.  Id.   
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.   
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1. Legal Advice 
In turning to the first part of Model Rule 4.3, does the Washington D.C. 
criminal defense attorney’s response constitute legal advice? 
While the model rule itself does not define what is meant by legal 
advice, courts have attempted to provide their own definition.56  In this 
regard, courts have held that “there is a difference between merely 
providing legal information and providing legal advice.”57  However, 
defining the exact difference between what constitutes legal information 
and legal advice is extremely difficult.  In fact, one commentator has 
argued the difference between legal advice and legal information is “a 
variation of Justice Stewart’s pornography definition, ‘I can’t define it, but 
I know it when I see it.’”58 
With respect to the ethical prohibition attendant to providing legal 
advice to unrepresented parties, one definition used by courts and cited to 
approvingly by one legal commentator defines legal advice “as giving an 
opinion as to the law applicable to the subject matter.”59  Professor 
Russell Engler has stated that “[f]or the purpose of recognizing 
impermissible statements or communications to unrepresented persons, 
this definition of legal advice is instructive.”60 
Based on the above definition, it would appear that some, but not all, 
parts of the criminal defense attorney’s answer as described above do in 
fact, “give an opinion as to the law applicable to the subject matter.”61  In 
this regard, the first part of the answer—in which the lawyer tells the 
witness that she is an officer of the court, that she cannot tell the witness 
to ignore a subpoena, and that the complainant should talk to the 
prosecutor—does not seem like legal advice.  In fact, the lawyer is actually 
telling the complainant that the lawyer cannot help her and the 
complainant should talk with someone else.  That is clearly the opposite of 
 
        56.  See, e.g., Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 901 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(distinguishing between communication of a legal nature and the application of law to facts, such as 
instructing on how to use information or consulting about legal consequences). 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  John M. Greacen, “No Legal Advice from Court Personnel” What Does That Mean?, JUDGES’ J., 
1995, at 10, 10.  
        59. Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) disapproved on other grounds, 
Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, P.A., 24 P.3d 593 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc); see also Russell 
Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor 
Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 96 (1997) (noting the definition of legal advice is also “an important 
inquiry in cases involving alleged attorney malpractice”).   
 60.  Engler, supra note 59, at 96.   
 61.  Franko, 762 P.2d at 1360.   
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legal advice. 
The same may not be so readily said regarding the second part of the 
lawyer’s answer, in which the lawyer tells the witness “it could be difficult for 
the government to make its case against the defendant without the complaining 
witness.”62  This seems to some extent to involve an application of the law 
to the subject matter.  This part of the lawyer’s statement helps the 
complainant achieve the goal of preventing the defendant from being 
convicted by drawing on the lawyer’s knowledge of evidentiary law and the 
applicable burden of proof.  This involves an application of legal principles 
to the subject matter at hand. 
However, criminal defense attorneys have argued that the giving of 
mere “procedural information” does not constitute legal advice and is 
instead simply legal information.63  As noted above, courts have accepted 
there is a difference between legal information and legal advice, although it 
may not always be easy to identify which category a particular statement 
belongs to.64 
To that end, would the lawyer’s response appear more in line with legal 
information than legal advice if the lawyer had simply said, “Generally 
speaking, when the complainant is not present, the prosecutor either withdraws the case 
or the judge dismisses it.”? 
While ethics authorities have offered little guidance with respect to what 
constitutes legal information in a criminal case,65 the Texas Office of 
Court Administration, recognizing that court clerks are prohibited by 
 
 62.  See id. (finding an attorney gave legal advice because he provided “an opinion as to the law 
applicable to the subject matter”).  
        63.  In re Conduct of Lawrence, 98 P.3d 366, 374 (Or. 2004) (en banc).   
 64.  See Dawson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 901 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding 
attorneys did not give legal advice by providing factual information, as opposed to consulting on legal 
consequences); see also N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2009-02 (2009) (noting when a lawyer’s 
adversary is a self-represented party, “it would be permissible for a lawyer to freely provide to a self-
represented non-client information that is ‘purely a matter of fact’”).  The same ethics opinion notes 
that un-represented parties are to be treated the same as self-represented parties for the purposes of a 
lawyer’s giving advice.  Id.; see also Greacen, supra note 58, at 10 (indicating the difficulty in 
determining the difference between legal information and legal advice).   
 65.  This guidance abounds in non-criminal contexts, particularly with respect to the role of 
court clerks in advising the general public.  See Robin Jean Davis, “Helping Self-Represented Litigants”, 
W. VA. LAW., June 2002, at 8 (noting “[a] large poster explaining the differences between legal 
information and legal advice also is now displayed in every West Virginia court”); see also Legal 
Information vs. Legal Advice, TEX. OFF. CT. ADMIN., 1, 5, 6 (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1220087/legalinformationvslegaladviceguidelines.pdf (providing 
general examples of the types of information that court clerks can provide to the general public).  
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statute from giving legal advice,66 prepared guidelines and instructions to 
help the clerks distinguish between legal advice and legal information.67  
Those guidelines indicate that legal information may consist of 
information regarding “common, routinely-employed court rules, court 
procedures, administrative practices, and local rules” and that clerks are 
permitted to “explain generally how the court and judges function.”68 
Perhaps a future court or disciplinary authority in the context of a 
criminal defense attorney’s communicating with an unrepresented 
complainant would want to adopt a broad definition of legal advice, which 
would in turn narrow the types of communications that could be regarded 
as simply legal information.  Certain policy concerns unique to this 
particular context may dictate such a result, namely that the purpose of 
Rule 4.3 is to prevent unrepresented parties from being taken advantage 
of,69 and also to further the truth seeking function at the core of the 
criminal justice system.70 
However, putting such policy matters aside, if one were to employ the 
same analytical framework adopted by the Texas Office of Court 
Administration, it can certainly be argued that defense counsel’s statement, 
“Generally speaking, when a witness is not present the case is dismissed,” constitutes 
mere legal information.  In this sense, defense counsel’s statement appears 
less like “an opinion as to the law applicable to the subject matter”71 and 
more a statement reflecting routine court procedures72 and explaining 
“generally how the court and judges function.”73 
Accordingly, whether one has provided legal advice may turn on the 
artful use of certain words and phrases and even then, may be subject to 
debate.74 
 
 66.  See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.101 (West 2015) (defining the phrase “practice of law”). 
 67.  See generally Legal Information vs. Legal Advice, supra note 65 (distinguishing between legal 
advice and legal information as well as providing a list of actions clerks are allowed and prohibited 
from engaging in).  
 68.  Id. at 5. 
 69.  N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 898 (2011) (citing MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (positing “[t]he basis for the rule against 
giving legal advice to unrepresented parties is ‘the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the 
unrepresented person’s interests’”).   
 70.  See Harris, supra note 30, at 494 (stating that of the goals the criminal justice system is 
designed to promote, finding the truth emerges as a preeminent goal).   
 71.  Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) disapproved by on other grounds, 
Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, P.A., 24 P.3d 593 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc). 
 72.  Legal Information vs. Legal Advice, supra note 65, at 1, 5. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  If one were to conclude that the lawyer’s advice was ethically permitted, but nevertheless 
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2. Adverse Party 
It may be suggested that parsing each sentence of a lawyer’s given 
answer to determine if the lawyer provided the unrepresented complainant 
with legal advice is not necessary.  In this regard, one could conclude even 
if the entirety of the sample answer is legal advice, the defense attorney 
will not have violated Rule 4.3. 
The reason for this is simple.  Rule 4.3 only prohibits the giving of legal 
advice to an unrepresented party when the lawyer “knows or reasonably 
should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable 
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.”75  In fact, 
comment 2 to Rule 4.3 emphasizes this fact and reads in relevant part, 
“[t]he Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented 
persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer’s client and 
those in which the person’s interests are not in conflict with the 
client’s.”76  The argument follows that the interests of the defendant and 
the victim were not in conflict, because each wanted the criminal charges 
dismissed.  Accordingly, the Washington D.C. defense lawyer’s statement 
did not violate the strictures of Rule 4.3, even if parts of it did constitute 
legal advice. 
However, there is little case law addressing the question of when the 
parties in a criminal case may find their interests are in conflict with one 
another for the purposes of Rule 4.3.  Further, the rule itself does not 
address this particular question in its text or the accompanying comments.  
What little guidance exists with respect to this issue can be gleaned from 
the case of In re Conduct of Lawrence,77 in which the Oregon Supreme Court 
held in the specific context of a domestic violence case, the defendant and 
the complainant’s interests were deemed to be per se adverse to one 
another, despite the fact that both parties desired withdrawing the criminal 
charges.78 
 
caused the complainant to absent herself from court, it cannot be said that the lawyer violated Model 
Rule 3.4.  Rule 3.4 provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to 
evidence.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (emphasis added).  
Even assuming that the complainant’s not coming to court constituted obstructing the other parties 
access to evidence, because defense counsel’s statement complied with Rule 3.4(a), it cannot be said 
to be unlawful in that regard.  However, the opposite conclusion may be true with respect to the 
crime of witness tampering, as discussed below.   
 75.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 76.  Id. at cmt. 2.  
        77.  In re Conduct of Lawrence, 98 P.3d 366, 373 (Or. 2004) (en banc). 
 78.  Id. 
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In Lawrence, defense counsel provided legal advice to the complainant in 
a domestic violence case because the complainant wished to see the case 
dismissed.79  The lawyer advised the complainant that in the lawyer’s 
opinion, the Oregon Constitution “granted to victims of domestic assault 
the right to require a trial court to dismiss the criminal charges against the 
defendant.”80  Based on this particular interpretation of the state 
constitution, defense counsel instructed the complainant that she should 
speak with the district attorney and also instructed her on how to present 
this particular legal argument to the trial judge.81 
When the district attorney’s office filed a disciplinary complaint 
accusing defense counsel of violating Oregon’s then version of Model 
Rule 4.3,82 defense counsel in turn argued that she did not provide legal 
advice to a party in conflict with her client because the complainant and 
the defendant “desired the same outcome,” meaning dismissal of the 
criminal case.83 
The Oregon Supreme Court noted its version of Rule 4.3 did not define 
what it meant for a person’s interests to be in “conflict” with that of the 
client.84  However, the court found the disciplinary rule defining what 
constitutes a conflict of interest in the representation of current clients did 
provide useful context.85  Under the disciplinary rules in Oregon then in 
 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. at 369–70. 
 81.  Id. at 370.  
 82.  Id. at 372.  The applicable version of Oregon Disciplinary Rule, DR 7–104(A), provides, in 
part: 
During the course of the lawyer’s representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
* * * * * 
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure 
counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict 
with the interests of the lawyer’s client. 
OR. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 7-104(A) (2003).  This particular rule differs from Rule 4.3 
in that it does not reference “legal advice” and instead speaks more broadly of “advice” in general.  
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
giving legal advice to an unrepresented person).  The Oregon Disciplinary Rules at issue in Lawrence 
have been repealed.  Oregon has enacted a new disciplinary code that tracks more closely to the 
entirety of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2015).   
 83.  In re Lawrence, 98 P.3d at 372 (restating defense counsel’s view “that there was no possibility 
of a conflict of interest in any event, because both [the defendant] and [complainant] desired the 
same outcome: dismissal of [the defendant’s] criminal case”).   
 84.  Id. at 373.   
 85.  Id.   
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effect, a conflict could be “actual” or “likely” and of particular pertinence, 
a “likely” conflict of interest could occur when “the objective personal, 
business or property interests of the clients are adverse.”86 
The court went on to hold, 
We think that the objective personal interests of an alleged batterer and the 
batterer’s victim are inherently adverse and, therefore, that there is a ‘likely’ 
conflict of interest when a lawyer gives advice to both the abuser and the 
victim.  For example, an unrepresented victim who is financially or 
otherwise dependent on the abuser may think that he or she has few options 
available other than to have the abuser return to the home to support or 
help the victim and any children involved.  The victim, therefore, may be 
motivated to recant for reasons other than that the abuse did not happen.  
Such a scenario could place the victim in a position of having to lie, thereby 
placing the victim in danger of being charged with perjury or filing a false 
police report, among other things.  In addition, a lawyer who has only the 
victim’s interests in mind well may be able to show the victim that other 
resources are available to assist him or her and that it would be in his or her 
and (and any children’s) best interest to have the abuser prosecuted.87 
The court further concluded pursuant to Oregon’s conflict of interest 
laws, the type of conflict that existed between the defendant and the 
complainant could not be waived by either party.88 
The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court in Lawrence, is extremely 
broad in that the Court found that the interests of the complainant and the 
defendant in a domestic violence case are per se in conflict.89  In this 
regard, Lawrence is particularly relevant because, as noted above, those 
instances in which a lawyer is asked by the complainant about the potential 
consequences of failing to appear in court occurs most often in domestic 
violence cases.90 
However, much of the court’s reasoning appears related to a specific 
type of domestic violence case—those in which the truthful victim may be 
 
 86.  Id. (citing Disciplinary Rules 5–105(A) and (A)(2)).  
 87.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 88.  See id. at 373 n.9 (finding the conflict at issue not waivable and therefore distinguishable 
from other types of conflicts (citing Oregon Att’y Disciplinary Rules, DR 5–105(D) and (F), and DR 
7–104(A)(2)).  
 89.  Id. at 373.  
 90.  See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 47 (stating domestic violence victims often approach defense 
attorneys to determine the consequences of not showing up for court because he or she no longer 
wants to pursue the claim). 
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motivated to recant to ensure that the defendant can continue to provide 
financial or other types of familial support.  In the Lawrence case, this 
appeared to be an issue of some concern.91 
Yet, there are obviously other types of domestic violence cases (for 
example, those between short term romantic partners, those in which the 
parties have no children, those in which neither party is financially 
dependent upon the other, and those cases in which the parties do not 
even remain in contact with one another).  Moreover, while most common 
in the context of domestic violence cases, the Lawrence court’s decision 
does not address instances in which a complainant in a case that does not 
involve domestic violence asks defense counsel about the consequences of 
not coming to court.  In light of the above, the rationale of the Lawrence 
decision is of questionable value in those criminal cases that differ factually 
from the facts of Lawrence itself. 
Further, how the Lawrence court chose to define an instance in which the 
parties’ interests may be in conflict with one another is related to how the 
state of Oregon’s attorney disciplinary rules defined potential conflicts of 
interests between an attorney’s own clients.92  In this sense, the court 
specifically found that a likely conflict existed between the parties’ personal 
interests.93  However, such language is not contained in ABA Model 
Rule 1.7, which addresses conflicts of interests between current clients.94  
Further, legal ethicists have observed “conflict of interest rules vary among 
states,” in part, “because of the different treatment accorded to ‘potential’ 
versus ‘actual’ conflicts of interest and the waiver and consent 
requirements.”95 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the government and the defendant, 
but not the complaining witness, are the named parties in the criminal 
 
 91.  Lawrence, 98 P.3d at 373 n.8 (“In the present case, Patricia Battle stated in her request for 
waiver of the no-contact condition of Warren Battle’s release agreement that her husband never had 
been abusive to her and that she needed him at home to care for their two daughters while she was at 
work.”). 
        92.  Id. at 373 (discussing Oregon’s Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) which declares that a conflict 
may be likely when considered from an objective standpoint). 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  It is not clear that an 
Oregon court could reach the same conclusion today.  As noted above, the Oregon disciplinary rules 
at issue in Lawrence have been replaced by a version that more closely tracks to the language of ABA 
Model Rule 1.7. See supra note 82. 
 95.  1 DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH L. MORGAN, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS § 4:19 (2016).   
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charge.96  Therefore, the complaining witness and the defendant are not, 
by definition, averse to each other.  Rather, the parties that are by 
definition averse to each other are the government and the defendant.  
(This is precisely why it is the state and not the complainant who has the 
authority to drop the charges.)97  To that end, and despite the view of the 
Lawrence court, some may suggest that it strains common sense to conclude 
that the complaining witness’s and the defendant’s interests are in conflict 
with each other, when both parties express the identical interest, i.e., that 
the defendant not be convicted. 
Ultimately, whether our D.C.-based criminal defense lawyer’s advice, in 
which he tells the complainant about the consequences of not appearing in 
court, is violative of Rule 4.3 is not obvious.  How one answers this 
question depends in part on how one defines legal advice in the context of 
communicating with an unrepresented party, and the answer also depends 
upon how a given court may determine when the interests of the 
defendant and the complainant are in conflict with one another. 
b. Witness Tampering 
Beyond ethical considerations, the crime of witness tampering may be 
implicated when an attorney responds to the complainant’s question 
regarding the likely consequences of not coming to court. 
While different jurisdictions may refer to the crime of witness tampering 
by a different name or have differently worded statutes, the Model Penal 
Code version of witness tampering, a similar version of which has been 
adopted in several states, is instructive with respect to this concern.98 
In terms of answering a complainant’s query regarding the 
consequences of not coming to court, Model Penal Code section 241.6(d) 
provides that a person is guilty of witness tampering “if, believing that an 
official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he 
attempts to induce or otherwise cause a witness or informant to . . . absent 
 
 96.  Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-302 (1997).   
 97.  See id. at 2 (acknowledging the prosecutor’s right to refuse to dismiss a claim “at the request 
of the complaining witness”).  
 98.  Model Penal Code section 241.6 defines the crime of witness tampering.  See MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 241.6 cmt. 1, n.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1980) (listing the following states have modeled 
their witness tampering statutes after the Model Penal Code version: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington and West 
Virginia).   
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himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been legally 
summoned.”99 
It should be noted that a defense attorney can engage in witness 
tampering even if the witness is not in receipt of an actual subpoena, so 
long as the defense attorney believes that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted.  As the comment to 
section 241.6 indicates, the term witness refers to one who is not just 
under subpoena, but one who will or may be called to testify (and for 
obvious reasons the complaining witness would fall into this category).100  
Hence, “it is no defense that the other person has not yet been 
subpoenaed or does not intend to testify.”101 
That being said, clearly, the part of the D.C. defense lawyer’s statement 
in which he tells a witness: “A subpoena is a court order . . . I cannot advise you to 
ignore the subpoena.  You should contact the prosecutor.”102 does not constitute 
witness tampering.  Telling a witness to follow the law and to contact the 
prosecutor is basically anti-witness tampering. 
However, will the defense lawyer commit the crime of witness 
tampering if he utters the second part of the proposed answer: “If pressed, I 
will concede that, depending on the facts of the case, it could be difficult for the 
government to make its case against the defendant without the complaining witness’ 
testimony and that the chances of the court actually issuing the warrant, at least in most 
jurisdictions, is very small. But, again, I cannot advise you to ignore the subpoena.  That 
would have to be your decision.”?103 
For the purposes of answering this question, perhaps the most 
important word in the Model Penal Code version of witness tampering is 
“induce.”  While the Model Penal Code does not define what this term 
means, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed this issue in the case of State 
v. Gray.104  The Gray court interpreted the use of the word “induce” in its 
own witness tampering statute, which is modeled after the Model Penal 
Code version, to mean, “‘to move by persuasion or influence’; ‘to call forth 
or bring about by influence or stimulation’; ‘EFFECT, CAUSE’; or ‘to 
 
 99.  Id. § 241.6(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1980).   
 100.  Id. at cmt. 2 (commenting the term is broadly defined because whether someone is a 
witness within the meaning of the Model Penal Code depends on the extent to which the defendant 
seeks to influence and affect the other person’s behavior).   
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Koehler, supra note 47.  
 103.  See id. (providing a response for when pressed by an unrepresented domestic violence 
victim about the consequences of failing to appear at court).   
 104.  State v. Gray, 258 P.3d 242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).   
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cause the formation of.’”105 
Further, the Model Penal Code version of witness tampering does not 
require that the defense lawyer’s statement actually induce the witness not 
to come to court.  Instead, the Model Penal Code version requires only 
that the defense lawyer in making such a statement attempt to induce the 
witness from absenting herself from the proceeding.106  The commentary 
to section 241.6(d) makes clear that the use of the word “attempt” in the 
statute means the actor “must intend to influence the other’s 
behavior.”107 
Simply put, to be guilty of the Model Penal Code version of witness 
tampering, the lawyer must have intended—through the use of his 
statement to the witness—to influence or persuade the witness not to 
come to court. 
Notwithstanding defense counsel’s caveat that “I cannot advise you to ignore 
the subpoena,” it is reasonable to infer that the second part of the proposed 
statement, in which the witness is told that if she doesn’t come to court 
the case will most likely be dismissed and a bench warrant will not be 
issued, was intended to influence or persuade the witness to absent herself 
from proceedings. 
If defense counsel’s intention was not to influence the witness to absent 
herself from judicial proceedings, there seems little reason defense counsel 
would say anything beyond directing the witness to speak with the 
prosecutor.  Other than attempting to influence the witness not to come 
to court, what could be counsel’s reason for telling the witness that not 
coming to court will help the client avoid a criminal conviction and there 
will likely be no consequences for failing to appear?  If the lawyer’s 
statement was not intended to influence or persuade the witness not to 
come to court, it seems entirely unclear what other purpose the statement 
was designed to serve.108 
 
 105.  Id. at 245 (citing Induce, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2004)). 
        106.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.6(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1980) 
 107.  See id. at cmt. 2 (“The [lawyer] must have a purpose to induce or otherwise to cause a 
witness . . . to engage in the conduct [set out in the statute].”).  
        108.  It should be noted that the attorney in the specific example used in this section provides 
the witness with additional information beyond the fact that she should contact the prosecutor only 
when “pressed by the complainant for a more detailed response.”  One could argue that the 
attorney’s reluctance to provide the witness with more information beyond the need to speak to the 
prosecutor suggests the attorney did not intend to influence the witness not to come to court.  Then 
again, it can be argued that the attorney’s intent to induce the witness not to come to court was 
formed after the complainant pressed the attorney for additional details.  A jury could presumably 
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Further, it may be argued that even telling the witness, “Generally 
speaking, when a witness is not present the case is dismissed,” (which may be 
considered legal information) constitutes witness tampering.  In this sense, 
regardless of whether a statement is considered legal information or legal 
advice, defense counsel has committed the crime of witness tampering if 
the jury concludes the statement was uttered with the intent of influencing 
or persuading (inducing) the witness not to come to court. 
Lastly, it should be noted that committing the crime of witness 
tampering necessarily means a violation of two other ethics provisions.  
Witness tampering represents a violation of Rule 3.4(a) and its prohibition 
against unlawfully obstructing “another party’s access to evidence.”109  A 
lawyer who engages in the criminal offense of witness tampering also 
violates Model Rule 8.4(b), which provides that it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.”110 
c. The Final Answer 
As stated above, ultimately, how a lawyer should choose to respond 
when confronted with the complaining witness’s question regarding the 
consequences of failing to appear for court is subject to discussion. 
The response that raises no ethical red flags is for the defense attorney 
to first inform the complainant that she represents the defendant and not 
the complainant.  Beyond that, the D.C. lawyer’s statement to the effect 
of, “A subpoena is a court order.  If you disobey the subpoena, the court could issue a 
warrant for your arrest.  I am an officer of the court.  I cannot advise you to ignore the 
subpoena.  You should contact the prosecutor.” is ethically appropriate.111 
Such a statement does not obstruct the opposing party’s access to 
evidence as prohibited by Rule 3.4(a), nor does it constitute legal advice, 
implicating any of the concerns addressed by Rule 4.3.  Nor does it raise 
the possibility of a conviction for witness tampering. 
Further, it is unclear that a lawyer can lawfully say more than that 
without raising Rule 4.3 related concerns in terms of giving legal advice 
and advising an unrepresented party or without engaging in witness 
 
reach either conclusion.  This reality highlights the fact that the legality of an attorney’s response to a 
witness’s question regarding the consequences of not coming to court will invariably turn on the 
specific facts of each individual case.  
 109.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 110.  Id. r. 8.4(b).   
        111.  Koehler, supra note 47 (emphasis added). 
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tampering.  Accordingly, because it is unclear that an attorney can press 
the matter farther than the immediate statement referenced above, such a 
statement satisfies Rule 1.3 and its mandate of zealous advocacy.112 
Of course, some attorneys may choose to respond in a less constrained 
manner.  Indeed, it should be acknowledged that differing interpretations 
are possible with respect to the ethical and criminal statutes implicated by 
this particular question.  Using the above discussion as guidance, any given 
attorney may choose to frame her particular response in a manner that she 
believes does not run afoul of ethical or criminal concerns.  Hence, how 
any given criminal defense lawyer chooses to respond may ultimately come 
down to how that individual attorney interprets the relevant law and how 
willing she may be to approach the ethical line.113 
 
 112.  Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for 
the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2165 (2003) (“Lawyers cannot be expected to 
conform their behavior to certain standards if they do not know what those standards are.  
Moreover, lawyers may take the safe approach in the face of confusing ethical expectations about 
zeal and opt for reduced zealousness in the advancement of defendants’ interests.”).   
 113.  It is worth briefly taking note of a common variation of the ethical dilemma created by the 
complainant’s question regarding the consequences of not coming to court.  This variation occurs 
when the lawyer’s own client asks the lawyer, “What happens if she [the complainant] doesn’t come to court?” 
This dilemma is capable of a fairly clear rules-based solution.  To that end, Model Rule 1.2(d) 
provides that  
[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows 
is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed 
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
Professor Joel S. Newman, in noting Model Rule 1.2(d) is a “rule of syntax,” has provided the 
following illustration of how the rule should be interpreted:  
If the lawyer uses the command form of the verb, then the lawyer is “counseling or assisting a 
criminal act” and should be disciplined.  On the other hand, if the lawyer merely answers the 
client’s questions, then she is “discussing the consequences of a proposed course of conduct” 
and should not be disciplined.  
Consider the following easy case; the actual transcript of a conversation overheard by an 
eavesdropping telephone operator: 
   The appellant: “. . . I killed her.” 
   The voice in Dallas: “Did you get rid of the weapon?” 
   The appellant: “No, I still got the weapon.” 
   The voice in Dallas: “Get rid of the weapon and sit tight and don’t talk to anyone, and I will 
fly down in the morning.” 
Of course, the “voice in Dallas” (which belonged to a lawyer) was violating Model Rule 1.2(d).  
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III.    QUESTION # 2 (WHAT SHOULD DEFENSE COUNSEL SAY TO 
A JUDGE WHO DIRECTLY ASKS COUNSEL 
ABOUT INCRIMINATING INFORMATION THAT IS PROTECTED BY 
ATTORNEY–CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY WHEN THE JUDGE CAN EASILY 
INFER THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REFUSAL TO ANSWER SUCH A 
QUESTION IS AN INDICATION OF THE CLIENT’S CULPABILITY?) 
A. The Factual Scenario 
Assume that a criminal defense lawyer represents a client charged with 
the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol.  The lawyer interviews 
her client and learns, because the client told her during the interview, that 
he has been convicted of a felony offense in another state.  (The particular 
offense or state does not matter much.) 
The case proceeds to trial and the defendant is found guilty.  The case is 
brought back for sentencing.  In preparation for the sentencing hearing, 
the probation department prepares a pre-sentence report, part of which 
contains the defendant’s prior criminal record.  The probation department 
compiles information related to the defendant’s prior criminal record by 
conducting a background check utilizing databases that are available to law 
enforcement.  The probation report indicates that the defendant has no 
prior criminal convictions.  The probation department made a mistake and 
missed the felony conviction from the other jurisdiction. 
 
The fatal error was the use of the command: “Get rid of the weapon.” 
What if the conversation had been as follows: 
   Appellant: “What would happen if I got rid of the weapon?” 
   The voice in Dallas: “If you got rid of the weapon, it would be harder to convict you.” 
It is likely that the consequence of that conversation would have been the same as the 
consequence of the real one—the appellant would get rid of the weapon.  However, while the 
actual conversation was a clear violation of Rule 1.2(d), the alternative conversation would have 
been an appropriate discussion of the legal consequences of a proposed course of action. 
Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 290–91 (1994). 
 Accordingly, if the lawyer tells the client to encourage the witness not to come to court, then 
the lawyer will have violated Rule 1.2(d) because the lawyer will have counseled the client to engage 
in witness tampering, discussed in section (2)(b).  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  The lawyer will have also violated Model Rule 3.4(a), which prohibits 
unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence.  Id. r. 3.4(a).  However, if the lawyer simply 
answers the client’s question by informing the client that “if the complainant doesn’t come to court, it will be 
harder to convict you” the lawyer is simply addressing the legal consequences associated with a particular 
act and no ethical violation will have occurred.  
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At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge reviews the probation report.  
She looks up at the prosecutor, looks at the defendant and then says to the 
defense attorney, “I have reviewed the probation report.  I can put the defendant in 
jail, or I can put him on probation.  I do not see a prior criminal conviction.  So, I am 
inclined to put him on probation.”  After uttering the above statement, the trial 
judge then turns to the defense lawyer and says, “Counsel, are you aware of any 
criminal convictions that are not before the court?” 
What should the defense lawyer say or do when she is asked this 
question directly by the trial judge? 
What follows below is an exploration of the competing ethical 
obligations that the defense lawyer must contend with when she finds 
herself in a situation in which a judge directly asks counsel about 
incriminating information that is protected by attorney–client 
confidentiality and counsel’s revealing such information would be 
detrimental to the client.  This Part identifies the most ethically 
appropriate (albeit, inevitably flawed) response.114 
 
 114.  It should be noted that the particular hypothetical used here involves a sentencing hearing.  
Ultimately, the ethical dilemma that is the subject of Part II of this Article which focuses on how 
defense counsel should respond when asked a question directly by the trial judge.  As will be 
demonstrated below, this particular predicament implicates concerns related to “Confidentiality of 
Information” (Rule 1.6), “Candor Toward the Tribunal” (Rule 3.3), and “Diligence” (Rule 1.3).  
Ultimately, as will be further demonstrated, the way in which an attorney should respond in the 
context of this particular sentencing hypothetical is equally applicable in any factual setting in which 
defense counsel is asked a question directly by the trial judge and the same ethical considerations are 
attendant.  
 However, in the specific context of a sentencing hearing, this scenario raises an additional 
ethical question that is not the subject of this Article—whether the lawyer has an obligation to 
correct the trial judge in terms of the judge’s mistaken belief, even if the trial judge does not directly 
ask defense counsel if the information is correct.  If the court relies on information provided solely 
by the prosecutor or by the probation department, so long as defense counsel does not falsely 
confirm or imply that the defendant has no prior criminal record, “there is a professional consensus 
that when the prosecutor misinforms the sentencing judge, or the judge wrongly assumes that the 
defendant has no prior criminal convictions, the defense lawyer need not correct the judge.”  Green, 
supra note 12 at 1112–13 (citing several opinions authored by professional ethics committees).  
Indeed, although such information may be available as a public record, the lawyer’s knowledge of the 
defendant’s record is considered confidential and disclosure is therefore not allowed.  Id. at 1113 
(citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)).  Moreover, disclosure of 
such information would likewise “violate the duty of zealous advocacy” owed to the client.  Id. (citing 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR7-101(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1986)). 
 On the other hand, when the court is relying on information provided to the probation 
department, from the defendant himself, or the court is told directly by the defendant that he has no 
criminal record, regardless of the duty of confidentiality owed to the client, the lawyer must attempt 
to convince the client to rectify the problem, and if that is not successful, to withdraw from the 
proceeding.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring the 
lawyer take remedial measures when the lawyer is aware that the client has “engaged in criminal or 
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B. The Ethical Response 
1. Defense Counsel’s Competing Ethical Obligations 
The above dilemma requires that defense counsel strike a delicate 
balance between competing ethics rules.115  First, a lawyer has a duty of 
candor to the tribunal as defined in Model Rule 3.3.116  Subsection (a)(1) 
of this rule provides in relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”117 
Second, defense counsel must be mindful of her duty to maintain 
confidential client information reflected in Model Rule 1.6.118  The 
relevant portions of Rule 1.6 provide that, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
 
fraudulent conduct” related to the adjudicatory proceedings); see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (discussing the courses of action available to 
attorneys in situations where the attorney knows, or has reason to know, that his witness will give 
false testimony).  If the court will not allow the defense attorney to withdraw, the lawyer is required 
to disclose the defendant’s falsehood to the court, even if doing so would require that counsel 
divulge otherwise confidential information.  Id.  Importantly, the above obligation also applies 
regardless of whether the defendant was under oath at the time he gave his statement.  See Utah 
Ethics Comm. Op. 00-06 (2000) (reasoning that because the ABA Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility has even applied Rule 3.3’s disclosure requirements to pretrial matters, 
defense counsel’s duty to take remedial measures to correct the client’s falsehood applies regardless 
of whether the client is under oath).  Further, the above course of action is also mandated when the 
client’s false statement was given only to the probation department as opposed to the court alone.  
See Philip A. Cherner, The Attorney, the Client and the Criminal History: A Dangerous Trio, 23 COLO. LAW. 
569, 570 (1994) (noting the word “tribunal” within the context of ethics rules necessarily 
encompasses the probation department “as an arm of the court,” and therefore, “representations 
made to the probation officer are akin to those made to the judge and the same ethical constraints 
apply” (citing Smith v. People, 428 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1967) (en banc))).   
 115.  Interestingly, the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct does not appear to address the 
propriety of a judge asking a question that triggers the duty of attorney–client confidentiality.  This 
issue has also not been addressed by legal scholars.  Certainly, a judge asking questions that implicate 
confidentiality concerns appears inappropriate, because the lawyer’s refusing to answer the question, 
citing ethical constraints, may be viewed as an implicit disclosure of information that is harmful to 
the client.  Further, because of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, it would of 
course be inappropriate for the judge to put certain types of questions directly to the defendant 
himself.  Why then should the judge be able to undermine the protection against self-incrimination 
by simply asking the lawyer a question that could not be asked of the client?  Perhaps this topic has 
not been the subject of more formal code regulation because it seems unlikely that most judges ask 
questions of a lawyer for the express purpose of breaching confidentiality or discovering 
incriminating information.  Moreover, the judge asking defense counsel questions regarding aspects 
of the client’s case, such as if the lawyer agrees with probation’s assessment of the defendant’s prior 
record, or if the lawyer knows the defendant’s whereabouts prior to the judge issuing a bench 
warrant, may be viewed as the judge treating the defendant fairly by bringing his lawyer into the 
decision-making process.  
 116.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 117.  Id. r. 3.3(a)(1).   
 118.  See id. r. 1.6 (requiring lawyers to keep information provided by clients confidential).  
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information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent”119 or “the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order 
to carry out the representation.”120  What constitutes information for the 
purposes of Rule 1.6 is indeed quite broad.  As commentators have noted, 
Rule 1.6 makes clear that lawyers have an obligation to refrain from 
revealing all information relating to representation of a client that their 
clients have not consented to have disclosed,121 whatever its source.122 
Lastly, defense counsel has an obligation to zealously represent her 
client as defined in Rule 1.3, as previously discussed.123 
In the above scenario, defense counsel is stuck between the proverbial 
rock and an ethical hard place.  She violates Rule 3.3(a)(1) and its 
prohibition against knowingly making false statements of fact to the 
tribunal if she says, “Your Honor, you are correct.  My client has no prior criminal 
convictions.”  Defense counsel knows this statement is false because she was 
told by her client that he had a previous criminal conviction.124 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id.  Rule 1.6 also provides several circumstances in which disclosure is permitted that are 
not otherwise implicated by this section’s discussion.  See generally id. (allowing attorneys to reveal 
confidential information to prevent clients from engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct if it will 
affect another party financially, or to mitigate damages if a client has engaged in such conduct).   
 121.  Peter K. Rofes, Another Misunderstood Relation: Confidentiality and the Duty to Report, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 621, 627 (2001) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016)).   
 122.  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(applying the confidentiality rule to information the client confidentially communicates as well as 
information the lawyer receives from other sources); Rofes, supra note 121, at 627 (“The 
confidentiality rule . . . applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also 
to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.” (citing MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016))).  
 123.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 124.  Of course, one may advance the indeterminacy of truth argument.  Perhaps the client, for 
whatever reason, is simply making up the existence of the out-of-state conviction.  Hence, a lawyer 
can never really know that the probation report is wrong, because the lawyer can never really know 
that the information provided to her by the client is actually true.  Therefore, in affirming the validity 
of the probation report, the lawyer cannot be said to have knowingly made a false statement of fact. 
However, the drafters of the Model Rules have rejected the indeterminacy of truth argument.  The 
Model Rules define “knowledge” by stating that knowledge “denotes actual knowledge of the fact in 
question.  A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”  Id. r. 1.0(f).  Comment 8 to 
Rule 3.3, further provides that, “the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.”  Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 8.  
Obviously then, the drafters of the Model Rules have accepted that there is a point at which the 
lawyer will be deemed to have knowledge of a particular fact.  In terms of whether a lawyer will be 
deemed to have knowledge of a particular fact because the lawyer was told such by the client, noted 
ethicist Steven Lubet has posited, “[a]s an ethical matter . . . we should be more ready to assume that 
our client’s words—both helpful and damaging—are likely to be true.  It is after all, the client’s case.”  
STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 6 (Nat’l Inst. for Trial 
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On the other hand, defense counsel violates duty of confidentiality 
imposed by Rule 1.6 if she corrects the trial court and says, “Your Honor, 
what’s in the probation report is not accurate.  My client was convicted of a felony offense 
in another state.”  This constitutes an obvious violation of the lawyer’s duty 
of confidentiality because the existence of the out-of-state conviction 
constitutes information related to the client’s representation that was 
disclosed without the client’s consent, nor was such a disclosure impliedly 
authorized. 
Disclosure of the conviction, which only increases the chance of the 
defendant receiving a worse sentence, also violates the duty of zealous 
advocacy mandated by Rule 1.3, which includes an obligation “not to harm 
or prejudice the client.”125 
2. The Prevailing View: Refuse to Answer, Citing the Duty of 
Confidentiality 
ABA Formal Opinion 87-353, written in 1987, addressed the exact 
situation where the judge asks the defense lawyer whether her client has a 
criminal record and the lawyer is aware that the client does have a criminal 
record, either from her own investigation, or because she was told so 
directly by the client.126  The opinion stated that because such an instance 
does not implicate questions of client fraud or perjury, the lawyer is 
prohibited under Rule 1.6 from disclosing information relating to the 
representation.127  Further, the opinion noted that in addition to not 
revealing client confidences, the lawyer must also refrain from making any 
false statements to the court.128  Accordingly, the authors of the opinion 
suggested that the lawyer should “ask the court to excuse [her] from 
answering the question.”129 
Of course, if the lawyer believed the information provided by the 
probation department were correct, the lawyer would confirm such.  
Therefore, it is fairly obvious that the only reason defense counsel has 
 
Advocacy eds., 4th ed. 2009).  Accordingly, for the purposes of this section’s hypothetical, it can be 
said that the lawyer who tells the judge that the defendant has no prior criminal record has knowingly 
made a false statement, because defense counsel will be deemed to have knowledge of the 
defendant’s out-of-state criminal conviction. 
 125.  Green, supra note 12 at 1113 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
101(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1986)).   
 126.  ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).   
 127.  Id.   
 128.  Id. at n.5. 
 129.  Id.  
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refused to answer the judge’s question regarding the existence of the 
defendant’s prior criminal record is because counsel is aware of the fact 
that the defendant does in fact have a criminal conviction. 
Refusing to answer the question in such a way may be viewed as an 
implicit disclosure of information provided by the client in violation of the 
duty to preserve client confidentiality.  Further, it may be viewed as 
inconsistent with zealous advocacy—because of defense counsel’s actions, 
the court and the prosecutor are likely to inquire further, discover the 
conviction and use that conviction in a manner that is harmful to the 
defendant. 
Yet, the drafters of Formal Opinion 87-353 accepted this reality and 
without much elaboration, stated that it represented the most ethically 
appropriate course of action, despite its obvious shortcoming.130  Indeed, 
as the drafters of the opinion went on to note, “[t]he Committee can offer 
no better guidance under the Model Rules, despite the fact that such a 
request by the lawyer most likely will put the court on further 
inquiry . . . .”131 
It is important to recognize that the ethical dilemma described above is 
not unique to the context of sentencing.  Rather, it can occur in almost any 
factual setting in which a judge asks defense counsel a question that 
implicates concerns related to client confidentiality, candor toward the 
tribunal and zealous advocacy.  Indeed, other ethics advisory committees 
have likewise concluded, consistent with Formal Opinion 87-353, that 
when defense counsel finds herself in such a predicament, she should ask 
to be excused from answering the question, due to ethical concerns, even 
in a non-sentencing context. 
To that end, the San Diego County Bar Association was asked by an 
attorney whether the attorney could “answer a court’s question asking if 
she has any idea why her client is not in court, when Attorney is aware of 
incriminating information that she suspects may explain her client’s 
absence?”132  In that particular case the attorney, who was representing 
the client on a drug charge, received a call from the client’s mother the 
night before court in which the client’s mother stated, “[D]on’t expect to 
 
 130.  This had previously been the position embraced by the older, Formal Opinion 287.  ABA 
Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 287 (1953).  Formal Opinion 87-353 
reaffirmed the Ethics Committee’s position that this was in fact the appropriate course of action. 
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).   
 131.  ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 at n.5 (1987).   
 132.  San Diego Cty. Bar Ass’n, Legal Ethics Op. 2011-1.   
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see Client in court tomorrow morning; he just left the house high as a 
kite.”133  Sure enough, not only does the client not appear in court, but 
the judge asks the attorney on the record, “Do you have any idea why your 
client is not here?”134 
The Bar Association Ethics Committee (referencing both California’s 
disciplinary rules, as well as the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct) concluded that the attorney could not tell the court that she was 
unaware of where her client was because doing so would violate her duty 
of candor to the court.135  The attorney, likewise, was “not at liberty to 
disclose the information imparted to her by the Client’s mother the night 
before, because even though that information was not relayed to her by 
the client and therefore is not protected by attorney-client privilege, it 
nonetheless constitutes confidential information.”136 
Of course, the drafters of the opinion were aware of the fact that in 
refusing to answer the question, the court might be put on notice that the 
attorney was in possession of information that was detrimental to the 
client, noting that the attorney would of course divulge to the court an 
exculpatory or unexceptional reason explaining the client’s absence, as 
such disclosure would not violate the duty of confidentiality.137  Further, 
because the attorney’s refusal to answer, or to provide some exculpatory 
response to the court’s question regarding the defendant’s whereabouts, 
 
 133.  Id.   
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id.  See supra note 24 for a discussion of the relationship between California’s ethical code 
and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
 136.  San Diego Cty. Bar Ass’n, Legal Ethics Op. 2011-1.  Comment 3 to ABA Model Rule 1.6 
describes the relationship between the ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorney–client privilege 
as follows:  
The attorney–client privilege and work–product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings 
in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence 
concerning a client.  The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than 
those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.  The confidentiality 
rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also 
to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  A lawyer may not disclose 
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6. cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 137.  See San Diego Cty. Bar Ass’n, Legal Ethics Op. 2011-1 (citing Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 
1993-133) (positing a disclosure of such exculpatory or unexceptional information does not violate 
attorney–client privilege because it is not information the client has requested not be revealed or that 
is otherwise detrimental or embarrassing to the client).   
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will prove detrimental to the client (the court will likely issue a bench 
warrant for the client’s arrest), concerns related to zealous advocacy are 
once again brought to the fore. 
Nevertheless, the ethics committee concluded that based on the facts of 
the case, the attorney’s “only ethical option is to inform the court 
respectfully that due to applicable ethics rules she is not at liberty to 
answer the question.”138 
3. Is There a Better Response than Refusing to Answer the Court’s 
Question? 
As demonstrated above, it is clear on the whole, ethics committees have 
concluded when an attorney is asked a question by the judge that 
implicates the three-fold ethics concerns of candor to the tribunal, client 
confidentiality, and zealous advocacy, the appropriate response is to refuse 
to answer the question citing relevant ethics rules.  While cognizant of the 
shortcomings associated with such a response, as previously indicated, the 
ABA Formal Opinion noted, “[t]he Committee can offer no better 
guidance under the Model Rules . . . .”139 
Could the Committee in fact offer better guidance?  Arguably they 
could, although such a conclusion is far from clear. 
a. The Technically True Response 
To that end, some attorneys may suggest the best possible response to a 
question posed by a judge that implicates these three particular ethical 
concerns is something other than refusing to answer the judge’s question.  
Rather, the best and most ethically appropriate response is to say 
something that is technically true and not harmful to the defendant.  
Whether or not such a response is consistent with ethical regulations was 
not explored in either of the ethics opinions cited above. 
To illustrate how such a response might work, let us return to the 
previous example taken from the context of a sentencing hearing.  To that 
end, when the judge asks, “Counsel, are you aware of any criminal convictions that 
are not before the court?” the defense attorney would say something to the 
effect, “I do not have any official documentation reflecting prior criminal convictions.”  
Or, if the defense counsel was simply told by the client about the prior 
criminal conviction but never reduced such to writing, the attorney could 
 
 138.  Id. (citing In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 979 (Ariz. 1995). 
 139.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 n.5 (1987). 
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pick up her file, look through it and say, “I have nothing in my file reflecting 
prior criminal convictions.”  Defense counsel may also say, “Your Honor, my 
client has no prior criminal convictions based on what is reflected in the probation 
report.” 
Those who might advocate for one of these technically true responses 
would likely suggest that this type of response represents an effective 
balance between these three competing ethical obligations.  First, saying, “I 
do not have any official documentation reflecting prior criminal convictions.” (or 
something to that effect) complies with Rule 1.6 in that it does not 
represent a breach of attorney–client confidentiality.140  The lawyer’s not 
having a particular court document does not seem to itself constitute 
information learned in the course of representing the client, and even if it 
did, it can be assumed that the client impliedly consented to this revelation 
because such a statement is far more advantageous to the client than the 
lawyer’s refusing to answer.141 
In this regard, this technically true statement is more advantageous to 
the client than refusing to answer the judge’s question, because it likely 
produces no, or fewer, red flags.  The lawyer’s response is calculated to 
make the judge believe the probation report is correct and the client has 
no prior criminal record.  The client will accordingly receive a reduced 
sentence.  Clearly then, this type of technically true response can be seen 
as more consistent with Rule 1.3’s duty of zealous advocacy than simply 
refusing to answer the judge’s question when such a refusal tacitly reveals 
to the judge and prosecutor the client’s prior criminal conviction. 
Lastly, because such a statement is actually true, it does not constitute a 
false statement of fact and therefore does not violate the lawyer’s duty of 
candor to the tribunal for the purposes of Rule 3.3. 
b. The Ethical Boundaries of a Technically True Response 
However, while innovative, these technically true statements are 
arguably unethical.  Such responses may be viewed this way because Model 
Rule 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”142  Importantly, Rule 8.4(c), while overlapping 
 
 140.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (indicating 
attorney–client privilege as giving effect to client-lawyer confidentiality). 
 141.  Id.   
 142.  See id. r. 8.4(c) (“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the 
absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to 
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somewhat with Rule 3.3’s duty of candor to the tribunal, is equally 
applicable to an attorney’s conduct and statements made before a trial 
court.143 
Of particular relevance to the question of whether these technically true 
statements given in response to the judge’s question violate Rule 8.4(c), is 
the rule’s use of the word “dishonesty.”144  While no decisional law or 
ethics opinions appear to have addressed the ethical ramifications of the 
technically accurate response to the ethical dilemma described immediately 
above, In re Shorter145 is instructive with respect to what constitutes 
dishonest conduct. 
In Shorter, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was called on to 
review the decision of the Board on Professional Responsibility, 
recommending the defendant’s disbarment following his federal 
conviction for failing to pay income taxes.146  While the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the crime in question was not a crime of moral turpitude, 
the court held the defendant’s disbarment was appropriate, in part because 
defendant violated an attorney disciplinary rule that prohibited conduct 
“involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”147 
In particular, Shorter took note of the fact that agents for the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) had initiated tax collection efforts that predated the 
filing of criminal charges.  During these tax collection efforts, the agents 
were attempting to identify any particular assets that could be used to pay 
Shorter’s back taxes. 
During these interviews, Shorter informed the agents that he had no 
personal assets.148  At Shorter’s criminal trial, an IRS Agent testified that 
when interviewed, Shorter was asked “if he had any bank account or any 
interest in any bank account . . . he replied no.”149  Similarly, when 
Shorter met with an IRS agent to make a financial statement, the agent 
asked Shorter if “he had cash in a bank account or a savings account or 
 
representation.”).   
 143.  See, e.g., In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 980 (Ariz. 1995) (censuring lawyers who are not honest 
with settlement judge for violating Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c)).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
White, 731 A.2d 447, 456–57 (Md. 1999) (holding a lawyer who lied in deposition and lied to the 
judge violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)). 
 144.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
        145.  In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760 (D.C. 1990). 
 146.  Id. at 761–62.   
 147.  Id. at 767 (citing DR 1-102(A)(4)).  While Shorter itself does not cite to Model Rule 8.4(c), 
the language of the disciplinary rule at issue in Shorter is identical.  
 148.  Id. at 763.   
 149.  Id. 
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any other financial institution,” and he answered that “[h]e had no 
accounts whatsoever.”150 
As it turns out, Shorter had a fairly interesting financial arrangement 
with his law partner, Bernadette Gartrell.  Shorter would simply take the 
money that he earned from representing clients and would give that 
money to Gartrell.151  She would in turn put the money in a bank account 
that was used by the firm and was not in Shorter’s name.152  All of 
Shorter’s expenses were paid by his firm from accounts held solely by 
Gartrell.153 
Accordingly, while Shorter was aware of the fact the IRS was interested 
in identifying any particular assets he may have had access to for the 
purposes of repaying his back taxes, Shorter provided technically correct 
answers when he indicated that he had no bank accounts in his name.154 
The Shorter court held that fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, while 
somewhat different from each other, all require “kinds of active deception 
or positive falsehood.”155  However, dishonesty, while also encompassing 
fraud, deceit and misrepresentation also “encompasses conduct evincing ‘a 
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; [a] lack of fairness and 
straightforwardness[.]’”156  Thus, in the words of the Shorter court, “what 
may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty.”157  Indeed, legal 
 
 150.  Id.   
 151.  Id. at 763–64.  
 152.  Id. at 763.   
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 768 (describing Shorter’s responses as “technically true”).   
 155.  Id. at 768 n.12 (providing specific definitions for fraud, deceit and dishonesty).  Further, 
these terms are not defined in the Model Rules themselves.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 156.  In re Shorter, 570 A.2d at 768 n.12 (citing Tucker v. Lower, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (Kan. 1967)).  
This particular definition of dishonest conduct has been accepted by other courts.  See People v. 
Katz, 58 P.3d 1176, 1189–90 (Colo. 2002) (“[D]ishonesty’ . . . encompasses fraudulent, deceitful, or 
misrepresentative behavior.  In addition to these, however, it encompasses conduct evincing a ‘lack 
of honesty, probity or integrity in principle . . . .’”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Sheridan, 
741 A.2d 1143, 1156 (Md. 1999) (“The most general term . . . is ‘dishonest,’ which encompasses 
fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative behavior.  In addition to these, however, it encompasses 
evincing a lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle . . . .”).  It also appears to have been 
generally accepted by legal commentators as well.  See Douglas R. Richmond, Appellate Ethics: Truth, 
Criticism, and Consequences, 23 REV. LITIG. 301, 306 (2004) (explaining the definition of dishonesty, 
which is not limited to fraudulent and deceitful acts).  
 157.  In re Shorter, 570 A.2d at 768.  In the example provided in this section, the lawyer has 
crafted her statement with the intent of misleading the trial judge in terms of the defendant’s prior 
criminal record.  However, specific intent is not a necessary ingredient of dishonesty or 
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commentators have noted “the threshold for what constitutes ‘dishonesty’ 
under Rule 8.4(c) is lower than lawyers might expect.”158 
In light of the above definitions, the court concluded that because 
Shorter’s statements were technically true159 and because he refrained from 
making, actually false statements, he did not engage in conduct that 
constituted fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.160 
However, the court held Shorter violated the attorney disciplinary rules 
by engaging in dishonest conduct, both because of the nature of his 
financial arrangements, which frustrated the IRS’s collection efforts, and 
because of the manner in which he answered the IRS agent’s questions.161 
In terms of Shorter’s technically true responses to the agent’s questions, 
the court noted that “[b]y his own acknowledgment respondent [Shorter] 
knew what information the IRS was after, but for his own benefit 
refrained from supplying that information even when asked questions that 
grazed the truth . . . [t]his conduct was of a dishonest character . . . .”162 
Consequently, in view of Shorter, it is clear an attorney cannot simply 
claim she engaged in no ethical wrongdoing simply because she provided a 
technically true response to a judge’s question regarding the defendant’s 
prior criminal record (or other confidentially protected type of information 
where disclosure would harm the defendant).  In fact, it can be argued that 
when a lawyer knows that a judge’s question is asked for the purposes of 
finding out a particular piece of information (similar to how Shorter knew 
the purpose of the IRS’s questions) and the attorney provides a technically 
true answer that otherwise creates a false impression in the mind of the 
court, (similar to how Shorter’s answers created a false impression in the 
minds of the IRS agents) such conduct, “evince[es] a lack of integrity and 




misrepresentation.  See In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 317 (D.C. 2003) (noting that a violation of 
Rule  8.4(c) can be premised on mental state of intent, knowingness, or recklessness).   
 158.  Richmond, supra note 156, at 306.   
 159.  Shorter, 570 A.2d at 768.   
 160.  Id.   
 161.  Id.   
 162.  Id.   
 163.  Id.   
 164.  Id.  
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c. Defining Dishonest Conduct Based on the Factual Context 
It may be suggested that an attorney’s having to choose between lying 
to the court, disclosing client confidences and possibly undermining the 
client, while responding to a judge’s question in a courtroom setting, is not 
the functional equivalent of Shorter being confronted by the IRS.  In this 
regard, Shorter’s acts of dishonesty were entirely for his own benefit.  
However, the attorney’s response was not for her own benefit, but instead 
for the benefit of her client based on her attempt to balance out 
competing ethical obligations. 
It is clear that the statement “Your Honor, my client has no prior criminal 
convictions based on what is reflected in the probation report.” was uttered with the 
intent of leaving the court with a particular impression that counsel knew 
to be untrue.  This is precisely why many advocates believe that such a 
response is preferable to the implied disclosure that comes with asking to 
be excused from answering the judge’s question.  Therefore, it is difficult 
to argue that in making this particular statement the attorney’s intent was 
something other than leaving the court with a particular belief concerning 
the defendant’s prior record that the attorney knew to be inaccurate.165 
Accordingly, if an attorney should be found not to have engaged in an 
act of dishonesty, it cannot relate to the attorney’s intent in uttering the 
above statement.166  Rather, it may be suggested that what constitutes 
dishonest conduct should in part be determined by whether the attorney is 
acting for her own benefit or whether she finds herself on the horns of an 
ethical dilemma in a courtroom setting. 
In this sense, perhaps as a policy matter, it may be wise to construe 
dishonest conduct differently based on the factual setting in which the 
attorney was behaving.  The argument follows that society should attach 
less culpability to the acts of an attorney who finds herself in the thick of a 
court created ethical dilemma and attempts to best represent her client 
than it should to an attorney who misleads the IRS to avoid paying back 
taxes.  The attorney who utters a technically true statement as a means of 
resolving this particular ethical trilemma should by definition not be 
viewed as having engaged in dishonest conduct.167 
 
 165.  However, as noted before, an attorney need not act with specific intent to violate 
Rule 8.4(c).  See In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 317 (D.C. 1990) (indicating the standard for 
dishonesty is recklessly or knowingly engaging in dishonesty).   
        166.  But see id. (“In order to find a violation of the rule in this case, the Board must find that 
Romansky acted knowingly or recklessly when he adjusted the client bills.”). 
        167.  See In re Shorter, 570 A.2d at 768 (viewing technically true statements as dishonest only 
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However, it may also be suggested that countervailing policy concerns 
dictate an attorney be held to the same standard of honest conduct 
regardless of whether she is acting outside of the courtroom, or attempting 
to balance out competing ethical obligations inside of it. 
In this regard, this countervailing policy argument can be seen in the 
interaction between Rule 8.4(c) and Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct 
that is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”168  Indeed, the 
interplay between these rules reflects emphasis on the particular 
importance of an attorney behaving honestly in her dealings with the 
tribunal.  To that end, apart from Rule 3.3, which was previously 
addressed, a violation of Model Rule 8.4(c) may also violate Model 
Rule 8.4(d).169 
Courts have held that conduct “prejudicial to the administration of 
justice” consists of conduct which either taints or improperly interferes 
with the decision-making process of a tribunal.170  Certainly, an attorney’s 
statement to the tribunal can bear directly upon any decision or the 
decision-making process of the court and could therefore, prejudicially 
influence the administration of justice. 
Accordingly, because defense counsel’s statements can prejudicially 
influence the administration of justice, there seems to be little reason why 
an attorney navigating competing ethics rules in a courtroom setting 
should otherwise be subject to a more watered-down standard of what 
constitutes honest conduct than any other attorney.  In this regard, a 
compelling reason certainly exists for applying exacting standards of 
honest conduct to those statements by defense counsel that can influence 
the court’s decision and correspondingly have a negative impact on the fair 
 
when the maker of the statement lacks integrity and straightforwardness when making the 
statements). 
 168.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  A violation of 
Rule 3.3(a)(1) is also a violation of Rule 8.4(c).  See In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 980 (Ariz. 1995) 
(concluding a violation of ER 3.3(a)(1) also amounts to a violation of ER8.4(c)); Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n v. White, 731 A.2d 447, 456–57 (Md. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that providing false and 
misleading testimony violates both Rules 8.4(c) and 3.3(a)(1)).  
 169.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c), (d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  See also In re 
Hansen, 877 P.2d 802, 804–06 (Ariz. 1994) (finding Hansen violated rules 8.4(c) and (d) by “engaging 
in conduct that involves dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation and that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice”).   
 170.  See In re Reback, 487 A.2d 235, 239 (D.C. 1985) (determining “the prohibition against 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice bars not only those activities which may cause a 
tribunal to reach an incorrect decision, but also conduct which taints the decision[-]making process” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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administration of justice.  To that end, Rule 8.4 seems to embrace such an 
approach by drawing no distinction based on the factual setting in which 
counsel behaves.171 
C. The Final Answer 
Ultimately, when defense counsel is asked a question by a judge and 
answering that question would violate attorney client confidentiality and 
harm the client, it may be suggested that the most ethically appropriate 
response is for defense counsel to ask that she be excused from answering 
the question, citing ethical considerations. 
There is no doubt that such a response is far from perfect.  The refusal 
to answer the judge’s question operates as an implicit disclosure of 
confidential client information and may ultimately harm the client. 
Yet, as demonstrated above, it is unclear that the alternative, i.e., 
answering in a technically true manner that does not disclose client 
confidences and leaves the court with an inaccurate impression that is 
beneficial to the client, necessarily constitutes honest behavior.  In this 
sense, because it is not clear that defense counsel can take a more 
aggressive tact, taking the safest ethical route and refusing to answer the 
question cannot be said to violate the attorney’s duty of zealous 
advocacy.172  In fact, current legal authority indicates that while flawed in 
its own respect, asking to be excused from answering the judge’s question 
is the most ethically sound response.173 
Perhaps defense counsel can refuse to answer the question, citing more 
generic reasons.  For example, defense counsel could say, “Your Honor, it is 
not my burden to produce any evidence for sentencing purposes that the government wants 
to use for the purposes of a sentencing increase.”174  Or, defense counsel could 
 
 171.  The fact that the attorney did not act out of an obviously selfish motive should certainly 
be viewed as a mitigating sentencing factor if counsel is found to have engaged in dishonest conduct 
or conduct that prejudicially influenced the administration of justice.  The Maryland Attorney 
Grievance Commission adopted this approach to violations of 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(d) that arose in the 
context of “robo-signing” affidavits for foreclosures without the attorney having knowledge of or 
verifying the facts.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 169 (Md. 2013).   
 172.  See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay 
for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2164 (2003) (noting it is ethically appropriate to 
refrain from the most aggressive from of advocacy when the ethical ramifications of such conduct 
are unclear).  
 173.  See supra Part III.B.2. referencing the ABA and San Diego County Bar Association ethics 
opinions.  
 174.  See United States v. Torres, 182 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The government shall 
bear the burden of proof for sentence increases and the defendant shall bear the burden of proof for 
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say, “As a general principal, I do not answer questions that if put directly to my client 
would constitute a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.”175  Obviously if defense counsel believed the client had no 
prior record, she would readily volunteer such information.  Therefore, 
whether these particular responses are better than refusing to answer is a 
matter of debate. 
As with the previous ethical question posed by this Article, how an 
attorney chooses to respond when asked a question by a judge that 
implicates concerns related to candor to the tribunal, client confidentiality 
and zealous advocacy may very well depend on how an attorney interprets 
the relevant ethics rules and her willingness to run the risk of having gone 
an ethical “bridge too far.”176 
IV.    QUESTION # 3 (CAN DEFENSE COUNSEL ZEALOUSLY ADVOCATE 
FOR AN INDIVIDUAL CLIENT IF DOING SO WOULD POTENTIALLY 
ANGER A PROSECUTOR WHO IS LIKELY TO RETALIATE 
BY PUNISHING THE ATTORNEY’S OTHER CLIENTS?) 
A. The Factual Scenario 
An attorney represents a client charged with the illegal possession of a 
firearm (whom we’ll call the “gun client”).  On the eve of the motion 
hearing, the attorney has discovered an important piece of evidence.  She 
has discovered a cell phone video of the stop of her client and the 
subsequent search of his person that led to the discovery of the firearm.  
The cell phone video plainly contradicts the police officer’s version of 
 
sentence decreases.”) (citing United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).  
 175.  “The Fifth Amendment by its terms prevents a person from being ‘compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’  To maintain that sentencing proceedings are not part 
of ‘any criminal case’ is contrary to the law and to common sense.”  Mitchell v. United States, 
526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999) (internal citations omitted).  Of course, adopting such a general policy may 
violate the duty of zealous advocacy that is owed to each individual client.  After all, some clients may 
not have a criminal record and refusing to confirm that fact could work to that individual client’s 
detriment.  
 176.  The expression “a bridge too far” is typically used to reference something that is too 
ambitious or drastic to be realistic, or to describe an action that is very complicated and challenging 
to execute, so much so that it is likely to fail.  What Does the Idiom “a Bridge Too Far” Mean?, 
WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-does-the-idiom-a-bridge-too-far-mean.htm (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2017).  The expression owes its roots to the failed mission of the Allied Forces 
during the Second World War to overtake a number of German bridges during Operation Market 
Garden.  Id.  That failure was the basis of both a novel, and a later film, carrying the title of  Bridge 
Too Far.  Id.  The novel and film are largely responsible for the idiom’s usage in English-speaking 
communities.  Id.   
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events and makes clear that the stop and search of her client was 
unconstitutional.  Once the video is shown to the judge during the motion 
to suppress, the judge should disbelieve the police officer and suppress the 
evidence. 
In the jurisdiction in question, defense counsel is only required to 
provide the prosecution with evidence it intends to introduce at a motions 
hearing if the prosecutor has filed a discovery demand.  In this particular 
case, the prosecutor has not filed such a demand, nor is the prosecutor 
aware that the video evidence exists. 
Defense counsel is concerned that if she were to show the video to the 
prosecutor beforehand and the police officer was alerted to the video’s 
contents, the police officer might invent some type of explanation that 
minimizes the evidentiary value of the video.  Simply put, the prosecutor 
and the police officer would find a way to work around the video’s 
damning contents. 
As a result, in defense counsel’s mind, not passing the cell phone video 
to the prosecutor before the motion, which defense counsel is not 
required to do, will preserve the element of surprise.  This course of action 
is therefore the best strategic decision defense counsel can make. 
Yet, defense counsel’s decision concerning whether to give the 
prosecutor the video before the motions hearing is not nearly so simple. 
Defense counsel also represents a client whose case is being handled by 
the same prosecutor.  This client is facing a mandatory five years in prison 
for accepting a large package that she knew contained marijuana (the 
marijuana client).  This five-year sentence is far more time than counsel’s 
client is facing in the firearm’s case.  The marijuana client is a single 
mother, the sole provider for her family, and has no prior criminal record.   
Defense counsel believes the best possible outcome for this client would 
be a sentence of house arrest.  Such a sentence would allow the client to 
stay home, work, and provide for her family. 
Getting a de-mandatorized sentence of house arrest is not easy.  The 
prosecutor would have to actually take such a request to her supervisor.  
Moreover, the supervisor is not likely to agree to a sentence of house 
arrest unless the prosecutor advocates for such. 
Defense counsel knows that—while they should not be—her advocacy 
in the gun case is connected to the client’s interests in the marijuana case. 
While counsel knows that not passing the video to the prosecutor 
beforehand maximizes the chances of winning the gun case, counsel also 
knows that adopting such a tactic will likely anger the prosecutor.  The 
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prosecutor will feel as though defense counsel “pulled a fast one” on her 
by giving her no opportunity to prepare for the introduction of this new 
evidence.  Further, the prosecutor may feel embarrassed that she presented 
obviously untruthful testimony. 
Consequently, when defense counsel goes to beg the prosecutor for a 
sentence of house arrest, this is likely to be met with a chilly response.  
The prosecutor, still angered by defense counsel’s aggressive surprise 
tactics, will retaliate.  The prosecutor will refuse to even consider, let alone 
approach her supervisor, for a sentence of house arrest.  This client who 
has no prior record and is the sole caretaker of her children will go to jail 
for five years. 
Should defense counsel decide that she should pass the video in the gun 
case to the prosecutor to have the best shot at preventing the single 
mother in the marijuana case from going to jail for five years?  Said 
another way, what should defense counsel do when she knows that 
zealous advocacy in the case of one client will lead to another client being 
punished for such advocacy? 
Unlike the two previously addressed ethical dilemmas, the dilemma 
identified immediately above lends itself to a relatively clear rules-based 
answer.  However, the complicated nature of this ethical quandary largely 
relates to the practical difficulties associated with implementing this rules-
based answer in the actual practice of law. 
B. The Ethical Response 
1. Ethical Obligations 
The above factual scenario implicates two specific ethics rules.  First, as 
noted throughout this work, defense counsel has a duty pursuant to 
Rule 1.3 to zealously represent the client.177  In this sense, the lawyer’s 
duty to pursue the most advantageous course of action for each of her 
clients is of paramount importance.178 
In terms of our current example, defense counsel must not pass the cell 
 
 177.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 178.  In addition to following ethical guidelines, criminal defense attorneys must also provide 
their clients with representation consistent with their clients’ Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding the 
Constitution is violated when “defense counsel’s representation falls below the level expected of 
reasonably competent defense counsel”).  Of course, the failure to zealously advocate for one’s client 
may also be a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
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phone video in the case of the gun client, because doing so is the most 
advantageous course of action that effectuates the client’s goal of winning 
the case.179  This also means that defense counsel must adopt what she 
believes to be the most effective negotiation strategy for achieving the de-
mandatorized sentence of house arrest in the marijuana case. 
Of course, lawyers also have obligations to avoid conflicts of interest 
which may prevent them from putting their most zealous foot forward. 
Model Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest that may arise between a 
lawyer’s current clients (referred to as concurrent conflict of interest).180  
Subsection (a)(1) of Rule 1.7 provides that a conflict of interest exists if 
“the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client.”181  Under Rule 1.7(a)(1), a “directly adverse” conflict of interest 
occurs in the following circumstances:  
1) when one of a lawyer’s clients asserts a claim against another client of the 
lawyer; 2) when a lawyer must cross examine a witness who is a client 
represented in a different matter; 3) when a lawyer represents a client against 
a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the matters are 
wholly unrelated.182 
 
 179.  While recognizing an obligation to zealously advocate for one’s client, comment 1 to 
Rule 1.3 states that, “[a] lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be 
realized for a client.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  For 
example, “a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means 
by which a matter should be pursued.”  Id.  This does not mean that a lawyer is ethically excused 
from pressing every strategic advantage for a client that would impact the outcome of the case.  As 
legal commentators have noted, the notion that a lawyer is not required to press for every advantage 
is largely limited to those instances in which, “the strategic decision would not materially prejudice 
the rights of your client.”  See What the Lawyer Decides in a Case, NAT’L PARALEGAL COLLEGE, 
https://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/Ethics/DutiesToClient/Wh
atLawyerDecidesInACase.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2017) (observing attorneys are often the ones who 
make strategic and procedural decisions in cases—not the clients themselves).  
 180.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 181.  Id. r. 1.7(a)(1).   
 182.  Ohio Adv. Op. 2008-04 (Ohio Bd. Com. Grievances and Discipline), 2008 WL 4186032, 
at *3 (2008) (interpreting Ohio’s version of Rule 1.7(a)(1) in the context of representing multiple 
defendants in a criminal case).  Ohio’s version of the rule reads the same as Model Rule 1.7(a)(1).  
Compare OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (2007) (tracking similar language to the 
Model Rules), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (declaring 
“a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest” 
wherein “the representation would be directly adverse to another client”).  When a criminal defense 
attorney represents multiple clients in the same proceeding,  
a directly adverse conflict will occur if one co-defendant accepts a favorable plea bargain in 
exchange for testimony against the other co-defendant; if the testimony of one co-defendant is 
 146 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 7:96 
In this regard, the hypothetical lawyer’s gun and marijuana clients are 
not directly adverse to one another.  None of the above three 
circumstances that give rise to a directly adverse conflict of interest are 
relevant to the attorney’s gun and marijuana clients. 
Subsection (a)(2) of Rule 1.7 relates to what may be called the materially 
limited conflict of interest, and states that a conflict exists if “there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former 
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”183  The 
comment to 1.7 elaborates on this subsection by noting, “[e]ven where 
there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a 
significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out 
an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a 
result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests.”184 
In this regard, it is important to take note of the central role that the 
threat of risk plays in the creation of a materially limited conflict of 
interest.  Simply put, a conflict of interest occurs because of the degree of 
risk involved, regardless of whether a substantive impropriety, such as a 
lack of zealous advocacy, eventuates.185 
The comment further addresses what constitutes a “significant risk” and 
states: 
the mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure 
and consent.  The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in 
interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with 
the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives 
 
unfavorable to the other co-defendant; or if a lawyer must impeach on cross examination one of 
the co-defendants he or she represents in the proceeding. 
Ohio Adv. Op. 2008-04 (Ohio Bd. Com. Grievances and Discipline), 2008 WL 4186032, at *4.   
 183.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 184.  Id. r. 1.7(a)(1) cmt. 8.  While not entirely congruent with the issue at hand, it is worth 
pointing out that Rule 1.8, while primarily addressing conflicts of interest that arise in the context of 
business dealings, states in Subsection (g) that a lawyer who represents multiple clients in a criminal 
case, “shall not participate in making . . . an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere 
pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.”  Id. r. 1.8(g).   
 185.  See Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 43, 54 (2009) (“Placing risk at the center of conflicts analysis results in an important point that 
can be overlooked: as a matter of professional ethics, a conflict of interest exists even if the feared 
eventuality never materializes.  In other words, a conflict is present if there is sufficient risk of 
resulting impairment, irrespective of whether the lawyer’s ability to function is ever adversely affected 
by the circumstances.”).   
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or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf 
of the client.186 
In other words, Rule 1.7(a)(2) “requires the likelihood of a material 
limitation on the representation before it can be invoked.”187  In 
interpreting the rule prohibiting materially limited conflicts of interest, one 
legal ethicist has noted that the rule requires not just that the possibility 
that the representation may be materially limited before it is invoked, but 
also substantial risk.188 
In terms of the gun and marijuana clients, a materially limited conflict of 
interest could exist, depending on the lawyer’s perception of the degree of 
risk involved.  The lawyer’s ability to represent the gun client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s desire to get the best possible deal for the 
marijuana client.  In this regard, while somewhat of a subjective 
determination at the time of representation,189 if there exists a significant 
risk190 that counsel will not pursue the most strategically advantageous 
course of action (not passing the cell phone video) out of fear that doing 
so will lead to retaliation against the marijuana client, then a materially 
 
 186.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 187.  Scott R. Rosner, Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigm of Athlete Representation, 11 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 193, 224 (2004) (interpreting the language of what is now Rule 1.7(a)(2) but at the time 
of the author’s writing was contained in Rule 1.7(b)).  Relatedly, the Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory 
Opinion Committee was asked to give an opinion on the question of whether it is ethical under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for a criminal defense attorney to advise a client/defendant to 
negotiate and enter into a plea agreement whereby the client waives all post-conviction claims, 
including claims of ineffective assistance of the attorney, except for claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based upon negotiating or entering into the plea or waiver.  Utah Ethics Op. 13-04 (Utah St. 
B.), 2013 WL 7393112, at *1.  While the committee concluded that advising the client with respect to 
such waivers violated Rule 1.7, a dissenting committee member took note of the fact that “[u]nder 
rule 1.7 only when there is a ‘significant risk’ that the attorney’s performance will be ‘materially 
limited’ by the personal interest at stake” does a conflict of interest occur.  Id. at *12.  The member 
further commented, “[h]ere, where the possibility of being publicly identified in an ineffective 
assistance ruling is so small, I do not believe that the attorney’s perceived interest in avoiding this 
would materially limit the lawyer’s ability to advise the client about the pros and cons of a plea deal.”  
Id. 
 188.  Rosner, supra note 187, at 224.   
 189.  See Gianfranco A. Pietrafesa, One Lawyer Representing Multiple Clients Sitting on the Same Side of 
the Table, 2006 N.J. LAW., 38, 39 (observing “[w]hether a limitation is material and a risk significant 
can be viewed as subjective standards”).  Of course, if an ethics complaint is brought against an 
attorney for violating conflict of interest rules, the inquiry will be “measured according to an 
objective standard, meaning that a lawyer’s conclusions will be evaluated based on the ‘facts and 
circumstances that the lawyer knew or should have known at the time of undertaking or continuing a 
representation.’” Eldred, supra note 185, at 53.  
 190.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring 
significant risk as an element for a finding of a concurrent conflict of interest).   
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limited conflict of interest has occurred. 
This example is fairly straightforward in that the question of whether 
defense counsel’s representation of the gun client would be materially 
limited by other concerns relates entirely to the decision to provide the cell 
phone video to the prosecutor.  However, it is important to note that in 
any given case, defense counsel may be required to make a myriad of 
strategic decisions related to motions and trial practice.  If in the course of 
making any of these decisions, or all them, defense counsel believes that a 
significant risk exists that her “ability to consider, recommend or carry out 
an appropriate course of action”191 is hampered by representation of 
another client, a materially limited conflict of interest exists. 
In the words of one legal observer, “absent the informed consent of the 
client, an attorney’s motion practice and sentence-bargaining efforts may 
not be limited by the attorney’s own professional interests or by her 
interest in obtaining favorable sentence agreements for other clients.”192 
Lastly, as previously indicated, if defense counsel decided to soft pedal 
her zeal and sacrifice the gun client for the marijuana client, not only was 
defense counsel laboring under a Rule 1.7 conflict of interest, she would 
also have violated Rule 1.3’s requirement of zealous advocacy. 
2. The Reality of the Materially Limited Conflict of Interest 
It is clear ethics rules mandate that defense counsel cannot compromise 
the representation of one client to serve the interests of other clients.193  
Little difficulty is posed by an application of this standard to fairly obvious 
examples.  To that end, it is clearly unethical for defense counsel to engage 
in overt trading with the prosecutor in a manner that explicitly benefits 
 
 191.  Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 8.  
 192.  Hoying, supra note 42, at 56.   
 193.  Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 
2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 90 (1995) (citing Model Code Disciplinary Rules 5-106, 7-101(A)(1), Model 
Rules 1.7 and 1.9, and ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function section 4-6.2(d)).  
This standard reads, “[d]efense counsel should not seek concessions favorable to one client by any 
agreement which is detrimental to the legitimate interests of a client in another case.”  STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-6.2(d) (Am. Bar Ass’n, 3d ed. 
1993).  See supra note 27 for further explanation of the importance of the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice.  Additionally, the new fourth edition of the Criminal Justice Standards contains 
virtually the same language as used in the third edition.  See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
DEFENSE § 4-6.2(i) (Am. Bar. Ass’n, 4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR 
THE DEFENSE, 4th Edition] (“Defense counsel should not recommend concessions favorable to one 
client by any agreement which is detrimental to the legitimate interests of a client in another case, 
unless both clients give their fully-informed consent.”).   
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one client to the detriment of another.194  For example, defense counsel 
cannot say, “I’ll talk person X into taking five years in prison if you give me 
probation for person Y.”  As commentators have noted, “[s]uch overt ‘trading’ 
plainly violates the lawyer’s duty of undivided loyalty to a client and is so 
blatant it is unlikely to be a serious systemic problem.”195 
Further, those instances in which criminal defendants’ interests are 
directly adverse under Rule 1.7, are not particularly common.  It is unlikely 
that in most cases of concurrent representation a criminal defense attorney 
will be representing a client who asserted a claim against one of the 
lawyer’s other clients, the lawyer will be forced to cross-examine a current 
client whom she represents in another matter, or the lawyer “represents a 
client against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if 
the matters are wholly unrelated.”196 
On the other hand, the above hypothetical involving gun and marijuana 
clients is more likely to be the type of ethically complicated conflict of 
interest case that defense lawyer’s encounter—one in which the potential 
for prosecutorial retaliation is unspoken and may in fact not materialize, 
but has nonetheless crept into the lawyer’s thought process. 
This is particularly true with respect to the system’s repeat players.  
Certain defense attorneys have several cases with the same prosecutor.  
This in turn increases the prosecutor’s opportunity to retaliate against the 
defense attorney’s numerous current and potentially future clients.197 
It is certainly the case that not all prosecutors would engage in 
retaliatory tactics (or would do so consciously).198  Moreover, the 
 
 194.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE, 4th Edition, supra note 193, at § 4-
6.2(i). 
 195.  Uphoff, supra note 193, at 91 n.72.  
 196.  The Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2008-4 
(2008).  Based on my experience as a criminal defense attorney, it is not common to have clients who 
have interests that are directly adverse to each other in terms of the three factual scenarios that give 
rise to such conflicts.  See supra note 49 for additional details of my experience as a criminal defense 
attorney.   
 197.  See Hoying, supra note 42, at 62 (“[B]ecause criminal defense attorneys are repeat players in 
the criminal justice system, the maintenance of a strong and positive personal and professional 
relationship with other players in the criminal justice system can be essential to a criminal defense 
attorney’s professional success.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1210 (1975) (“A defender assigned to a particular courtroom may well 
see more of the prosecutor assigned to that courtroom than he does of his wife, and when 
adversaries in the criminal justice system become too close, they may choose to help each other at 
the expense of the persons and the interests that they have been hired to serve.”).   
 198.  See Uphoff, supra note 193, at 89 (“Certainly there are many prosecutors who attempt to 
wield this power in a fair and even-handed way.”).  
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particular legal culture in any given jurisdiction is likely to influence 
prosecutorial behavior.  The more adversarial a particular culture, the more 
likely it is the prosecutor will view defense counsel’s zealous advocacy 
without much chagrin.  Of course, the opposite is also true—prosecutors 
are more likely to retaliate in anger against strong criminal defense 
attorneys in legal cultures with weak adversarial expectations.199 
Further, retaliating against a defense attorney’s client because of an 
attorney’s strong advocacy, whether implicitly or explicitly, raises ethical 
concerns that some prosecutors are not likely to engage.  Prosecutors have 
an overarching responsibility to do justice.200  While this prescription is 
somewhat vague,201 this duty necessarily entails the obligation to seek a 
fair result based on the facts of each case.202  If a prosecutor were simply 
to retaliate against one defendant because of the manner in which defense 
counsel advocated for another client, the prosecutor’s conduct would not 
be consistent with the obligation of seeking a just result because the 
prosecutor’s decision to retaliate was not based on the culpability of the 
individual defendant.203  Therefore, partaking in such behavior represents 
 
 199.  See id. at 90 (“The prosecutor in a county with a timid defense bar may single out the more 
zealous defense lawyer and refuse to provide her clients the kind of concessions generally provided 
the more pliant defense lawyers.”).   
 200.  Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991).  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate.  The responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special 
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”); see also 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE, 4th Edition, supra note 193, at § 3-1.2(c) (stating 
“[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice . . . not merely to convict”).   
 201.  See Zacharias, supra note 200, at 46 (remarking on the vagueness of prosecutor’s duty to 
“do justice”).  
 202.  See Angela J. Davis, Reform of the Prosecution Function, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 18 
(noting the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice in addition to applying the broader administration of 
criminal justice, also relates to individual cases).  This obligation to seek justice based on the facts of 
each case is an especially salient concern in the plea-bargaining context.  See Sylvia Shaz Shweder, 
Donating Debt to Society: Prosecutorial and Judicial Ethics of Plea Agreements and Sentences That Include 
Charitable Contributions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 377, 386 (2004) (“While plea bargaining is a useful 
prosecutorial tool, it cannot be used to the detriment of prosecutorial duties, such as the prosecutor’s 
special duty to ‘seek justice’ and to protect defendants’ rights.”).  The United States Attorneys’ 
Manual guides federal prosecutors in their special role in plea bargaining.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
MANUAL, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual tit. 9, § 9-27.000 (2d ed. 2004).  Prosecutors are responsible for 
delivering fair, evenhanded administration of the law so that the public and defendants have 
confidence that prosecutors base their decisions on the merits of each case.  Id. at § 9-27.001.  Plea 
agreements are expected to “reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.”  Id. 
at § 9-27.400(B). 
 203.  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 202, at § 9-27.230 
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a violation of the prosecutor’s special obligation to ensure the fairness of 
the criminal justice process as it relates to each individual case.204 
Nevertheless, as Professor Rodney Uphoff has observed, “[d]efense 
counsel who stands up to fight in one case may be concerned that the 
prosecutor will take it out on her other clients.”205  Certainly legal 
commentators believe that prosecutorial retaliation in response to strong 
advocacy is in fact quite real.206 
Of course, whether prosecutorial retaliation is real is somewhat besides 
the point in terms of a materially limited conflict of interest.  So long as 
defense counsel legitimately perceives the threat of prosecutorial retaliation 
as real, this perception rises to the level of a conflict of interest if it poses 
“a significant risk” to the lawyer’s “ability to consider, recommend or carry 
out an appropriate course of action”207 such that representation of one 
client “will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s responsibilities 
to another client.”208 
 
(outlining certain criteria—one of which is culpability—that should be given weight when assessing 
whether to prosecute). 
 204.  See supra note 202 (showing the decision-making process utilized by U.S. Attorneys when 
deciding to prosecute an individual).   
 205.  Uphoff, supra note 193, at 90.  This is not to suggest that defense attorneys fear the 
consequences of zealous advocacy are limited to a prosecutor’s retaliating against other clients.  
Defense attorneys recognize that the maintenance of a cooperative, positive relationship with the 
prosecutor and judge will often produce a more enjoyable work environment.  As a result, defense 
counsel may fear that angering the prosecutor or the judge could create a hostile or unpleasant work 
place.  Hoying, supra note 42, at 62–63.  Further, defense counsel may fear that aggressive advocacy 
could result in economic retaliation.  This is certainly the case if defense counsel’s advocacy angers a 
judge who has the power to withhold appointments.  Id.  However, under Rule 1.7, compromising 
the representation of one client to serve the lawyer’s personal interests is likewise prohibited.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The lawyer’s own 
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.”); see also 
Hoying, supra note 42, at 56 (stating “absent the informed consent of the client, an attorney’s motion 
practice and sentence-bargaining efforts may not be limited by the attorney’s own professional 
interests or by her interest in obtaining favorable sentence agreements for other clients”). 
 206.  See Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 
46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 78 (1985) (“Generally, prosecutors expect that defense attorneys will be 
cooperative in plea bargaining; they punish attorneys who are too adversarial in representing their 
clients by refusing to grant the typical plea bargaining concessions to these attorneys’ clients.”); see 
also James E. Bond, Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys, 15 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 837, 838 (1979) (observing young defense lawyers learn “that filing motions only 
irritates the prosecutor or judge, both of whom can and do ‘punish’ defense counsel for the zealous 
assertion of his client’s rights”).   
 207.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also supra 
note 189 (discussing the subjective and objective aspects of this determination).  
 208.  Id. r. 1.7(a)(2).   
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3. Waiver or Withdraw 
What should defense counsel do if she believes that a conflict of interest 
exists in her representation of concurrent clients? 
First, when a lawyer determines that the risk of conflict is sufficient to 
trigger the prescriptions of the ethical rules, the lawyer must resolve the 
ethical issue at the time the risk becomes apparent, and not wait until 
representation becomes compromised.209 
Accordingly, defense counsel has several options.  First, she can 
abandon either of the clients thus avoiding the potential of any conflict of 
interest.  For example, counsel, if possible, could choose to represent 
either the gun or the marijuana client, thus eliminating any potential 
conflict of interest issues.210 
If counsel does not adopt this approach, pursuant to Model 
Rule 1.7(b)(4) defense counsel is required to apprise the client of the 
potential conflict of interest and can continue with the representation 
when the client has given her informed consent in writing.211  As such, 
the lawyer in our example would have to explain to the gun client that she 
may give the cell phone video to the prosecutor before the motion’s 
hearing so that the prosecutor does not retaliate against the marijuana 
client. 
Of course, no client is likely to ever consent to the lawyer’s continued 
representation in such an instance.  If the client does not agree to 
continued representation, then the lawyer must withdraw from the 
case.212  Further, in criminal cases, a court can refuse to allow the client to 
waive the potential conflict of interest, then require representation by a 
different attorney, if the court finds that doing so serves the interests of 
justice.213 
 
 209.  Eldred, supra note 185, at 54; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (discussing the option of informed consent in representation if a concurrent 
conflict of interest exists).  
 210.  Hoying, supra note 42, at 64 (noting that when clients’ interests “are directly adverse to one 
another or might materially limit [the lawyer’s] ability to adequately represent both, the attorney either 
must abandon one of the conflicting interests or must obtain the informed consent of the client”).   
 211.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  Informed 
consent “denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has 
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably 
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”  Utah Ethics Op. 13-04 (Utah St. B.), 
2013 WL 7393112, at *13 n.15. 
 212.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 213.  In deciding whether or not a defendant should be able to waive a conflict of interest and 
continue to be represented by the counsel of his choice, “a court balances the defendant’s right to 
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Additionally, it should be pointed out that the Model Rules themselves 
do not address the question of whether defense counsel’s representation 
of one client may be materially limited by the potential representation of 
future clients.  In this sense, would defense counsel still be laboring under 
a conflict of interest if she thought that not passing the video would not be 
taken out on any current clients, but may make it harder to get worthwhile 
plea bargains for future clients? 
While the Model Rules themselves do not address conflicts with future 
clients, one legal commentator observed: 
Although an attorney’s consideration of the interests of future clients might 
not fall neatly into any of the categories established by the conflict rules, 
such a consideration creates a definite conflict and the attorney, therefore, 
must not allow this consideration to affect her representation of the client 
without obtaining the client’s informed consent.214 
In other words, if a defense attorney finds that her representation of a 
current client would be materially limited because of concerns related to 
possible future clients, then a conflict of interest exists and defense 
counsel must act accordingly.  This concern is likely to be particularly 
relevant with respect to the system’s repeat players. 
Further, it should be noted that this fact pattern has employed the 
example of prosecutorial retaliation in the context of plea-bargaining.  
Indeed, the plea-bargaining process is the most opportune point in the 
criminal justice system for a prosecutor to retaliate against a defense 
attorney’s clients following counsel’s aggressive advocacy.  This is because 
the vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargains,215 and 
because this is the point in the process where the prosecutor wields 
considerable power.216  Prosecutors often have significant discretion in 
terms of selecting charges, recommending sentences, and either offering 
concessions to those who plea bargain or punishing those who do not.217 
 
choose his representative against both the defendant’s countervailing right to conflict-free 
representation and the court’s independent interest in the integrity of criminal proceedings.”   
United States v. Bikundi, 80 F. Supp. 3d 9, 16 (D.C. 2015). 
 214.  Hoying, supra note 42, at 64–65.   
 215.  Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143 (2012) (demonstrating in recent statistics “[n]inety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of 
guilty pleas”). 
 216.  Uphoff, supra note 193, at 88 (indicating prosecutors “retain considerable power and 
discretion” regarding which cases are tried and which cases are settled). 
 217.  Id. (asserting prosecutors “can select from a wide range of potential changes” and “are free 
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However, a defense attorney’s obligation to avoid a conflict of interest 
that may occur because of the threat of prosecutorial retaliation is not 
limited to the plea bargaining context (this is the most likely circumstance 
in which retaliation will be encountered).  Rather, whenever the potential 
for prosecutorial retaliation, regardless of the context, has risen to the level 
of creating a material limiting conflict of interest, defense counsel’s 
obligations remain the same.218 
4. The Ethical Dilemma in the Real World 
As noted above, defense attorneys certainly recognize the threat of 
prosecutorial retaliation and commentators have noted its existence as 
well.219  However, in my career as a criminal defense attorney, I certainly 
cannot recall an instance in which a defense attorney conflicted out of a 
case because of the fear that a prosecutor would punish another client.  
There may be several reasons for this, some more insidious than others. 
Importantly, the threat of retaliation must be real enough220 that it rises 
to the level of a significant risk in that it will materially limit the “lawyer’s 
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of 
action for the client” because of the lawyer’s responsibilities or 
interests.221 
Yet, the criminal defense attorney may have varying degrees of 
confidence in her belief that a prosecutor will punish another client for the 
attorney’s aggressive advocacy.  This confidence may be based on past 
experiences with the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s reputation amongst 
the defense bar. 
This collective evidence may lead to the conclusion that there is a “mere 
 
to offer concessions or to threaten additional punishment to force defendants to accept some 
negotiated deal”). 
 218.  A potential example of prosecutorial retaliation in the non-plea-bargaining context would 
be a prosecutor’s refusal to stipulate to testimony of a defense witness in the absence of that witness 
being present.  In certain circumstances, the prosecutor’s refusal to stipulate could prejudice the 
defense.  Assume that counsel represents two clients on the same day in the same courtroom.  If the 
defense attorney fears that representation of one client could compromise the interests of another 
because the prosecutor will refuse to stipulate to the important testimony, the same conflict of 
interest concerns exist.  
 219.  See supra notes 205 and 206 for a discussion on how defense lawyers realize the risks 
associated with not fully cooperating with prosecutors. 
 220.  See supra note 189 for a discussion on the subjective and objective aspects of this 
determination.   
 221.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also supra 
note 210 (addressing how the threat of a conflict of interest is sufficient to trigger ethical concerns 
and require prospective enforcement).  
 2017] Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer 155 
possibility” that a difference in the clients’ “interests will eventuate.”222  
As stated in Part IV(B)(1), this possibility alone does not create a 
significant risk that the attorney will be materially constrained in her 
representation and hence, no conflict of interest exists.223  “The risk must 
be substantial.”224 
While this Article has provided a specific example in which retaliation 
was possible, the reality of prosecutorial retaliation may exist in the minds 
of criminal defense attorneys in a more general sense.  As a result, the 
potential for such retaliation occurs in a state of mere possibility.225  
Therefore, no specific conflict of interest exists. 
In light of this recognition, it is important to note if defense counsel’s 
representation of one client, does not rise to the level of materially limiting 
her representation of another client, “[d]efense counsel is ethically bound 
to fight zealously on behalf of a client even though counsel’s stance and 
efforts may irritate or offend a prosecutor who has the power to affect the 
disposition of counsel’s other cases.”226  In other words, the general fear 
of retaliation without more, does not create a conflict of interest, nor 
excuse the duty of zealous advocacy. 
Of course, some lawyers may constrain their advocacy in violation of 
Rule 1.3 and labor under a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7.  
These lawyers may choose between clients and consciously advance the 
interest of one client over the other.  Obviously, such action is ethically 
inappropriate.227  These lawyers may practice in this manner because they 
do not wish to anger the judge and the prosecutor by raising a conflict of 
interest concern and creating a difficult work environment, which 
compromises the lawyer’s future success.228  They may also have their 
own economic incentives related to continuing to represent a particular 
 
 222.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 223.  See supra note 187 (noting a conflict of interest will not automatically arise due to the mere 
fact that there may be a shift in interests of a client so that there will be different interests does not 
automatically add up to a conflict of interest).   
 224.  See supra note 187 (indicating a conflict of interest will only arise when there is a significant 
risk of an attorney’s interests conflicting with the ability to adequately represent a client is there a 
conflict of interest).  
 225.  See supra notes 185–89 (discussing the requirement that the materially limited conflict of 
interest must be likely).  
 226.  Uphoff, supra note 193, at 90.   
 227.  See supra notes 193–95 (discussing the ethics involved in representing and defending clients 
and when a violation of these ethics occurs).   
 228.  See supra notes 197, 205–06 (observing the ability of defense attorneys to participate in 
questionable practices as to avoid creating a stressful work environment for themselves).   
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client and/or continuing to receive court appointments.229 
However, while some lawyers may unfortunately engage in such 
conduct, what is much more likely is that such a lawyer plays various, 
subconscious psychological games in which she rationalizes the lack of 
zealous advocacy and ignores the conflict of interest, either because she 
truly favors one client over the other or to limit the professional 
repercussions associated with angering the judge or prosecutor, as 
described in the preceding paragraph.230  While fascinating literature has 
been written regarding the psychological dimensions of how lawyers 
rationalize conflict of interests,231 it suffices to say for the purposes of this 
work that attorneys “will rationalize behavior as consistent with ethical 
norms, even when in actuality the decision preferences self-interest.”232 
Accordingly, while ethics rules provide a clear answer to the question of 
how counsel should respond when zealous advocacy of one client will lead 
to prosecutorial retaliation against another client, there are obviously 
practical difficulties inherent in implementing the solution provided for in 
the Model Rules.  In light of this observation, apart from raising awareness 
amongst the defense bar with respect to subconscious influences that play 
a role in rationalizing away conflicts of interest, the antidote to the 
corrupting fear of prosecutorial retaliation is to change the existing legal 
culture within a given jurisdiction so that prosecutor’s do not view 
retaliation as an appropriate response to zealous advocacy. 
This is particularly important in two respects.  First, as noted above, 
zealous advocacy may be viewed as the norm in a given jurisdiction and 
not likely to provoke an angry response.233  When prosecutors recognize 
and respect the value of zealous advocacy, they are less likely to begrudge 
defense attorneys who represent their clients in such a manner. 
Second, a given legal culture may place greater emphasis on the ethical 
 
 229.  See supra note 205 (noting the economic interest in the continuance or discontinuance of 
representing a client).   
 230.  See supra notes 227–28 (describing the type of behavior that some attorneys will engage in 
when they put too much emphasis on keeping the peace with a prosecutor or judge). 
 231.  See generally Eldred, supra note 185 (illustrating the dynamics occurring when an attorney is 
contemplating a conflict of interest). 
 232.  Id. at 69.  Professor Eldred explored psychological studies relating to an attorney’s ability 
to prospectively and retrospectively assess conflicts of interest and concluded that attorneys, as a 
whole, are not well-suited to evaluate conflicts that arise during a criminal proceeding.  Id. at 64–77.  
Ultimately, Professor Eldred concluded that “[g]iven the evidence, current doctrine should be re-
evaluated to better align existing legal rules with how lawyers actually behave when conflicts are 
present or likely.”  Id. at 89.   
 233.  See supra notes 198–99.   
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limitations associated with engaging in prosecutorial retaliation in the face 
of aggressive defense lawyering.234  A prosecutor will most likely be able 
to invent a reason in any given case for why her actions did not constitute 
retaliation.  As a result, the ethical restraints associated with prosecutorial 
retaliation will most likely only be realized when a prosecutor voluntarily 
chooses to follow the relevant ethical rules.235  The more likely it is that 
the culture in place at a given prosecutor’s office encourages self-
enforcement with respect to this particular ethical issue, the more likely it 
is that the prosecutor’s actions will reflect voluntary restraint.236 
Obviously how to create or change a legal culture so that prosecutors 
respect the value of zealous advocacy and adhere the ethical limitations 
associated with prosecutorial retaliation lends itself to a lengthy discussion 
that is beyond this specific work.  Nevertheless, it is worth briefly noting 
that a change in lawyering culture can be brought about by addressing the 
manner in which lawyers (future prosecutors in particular) are trained in 
law school,237 through the culture of ethical lawyering fostered by local 
bar associations,238 professional associations that represent the interests of 
prosecutors,239 and through the specific type of training that takes place at 
a given prosecutor’s office.240  Certainly the more likely a prosecutor is to 
view zealous advocacy as normatively acceptable, the less likely it is that a 
defense attorney will be forced to confront the ethical questions posed by 
the threat of a prosecutor retaliating against one client because of counsel’s 
 
 234.  See id. (detailing how a prosecutor retaliating against one client because of defense 
counsel’s zealous advocacy for another client constitutes unethical behavior). 
 235.  For example, the Preamble and Scope of the ABA Model Rules state that “[c]ompliance 
with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and 
voluntary compliance.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 16.   
 236.  See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 
351–53 (2001) (noting how the culture of ethical lawyering that exists in individual prosecutors’ 
offices can impact the conduct of prosecutors).  
 237.  See Edward D. Re, Professionalism for the Legal Profession, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 683, 695 (2001) 
(“Lawyers are usually first introduced to the profession as students in law school.  It is in law school 
that lawyers first learn rules of law, are introduced to the practice of law, and the ideals of law as a 
profession.”).   
 238.  See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
193, 205 (1996) (acknowledging “the potential for great influence” held by bar associations).   
 239.  See Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prosecutors?, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 
515, 520 (2016) (noting the existence of “professional associations on which they are more likely to 
rely to articulate high professional expectations”).  
 240.  See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) (“One of the most 
important responsibilities of the United States Attorney and his senior deputies is ensuring that line 
attorneys are aware of the special ethical responsibilities of prosecutors, and that they resist the 
temptation to overreach.”).   
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zealous advocacy on behalf of another client. 
CONCLUSION 
The practice of law is fraught with ethical peril.  This is especially true 
for criminal defense lawyers.  In putting forth this Article’s version of the 
three hardest questions, this work has attempted to provide guidance to 
those criminal defense attorneys who find themselves confronted with one 
of these difficult rules-based ethical dilemmas.  In so doing, the ultimate 
goal of this work is to ensure zealous advocacy on behalf of every criminal 
defendant, while also ensuring that such an objective is carried out in a 
manner consistent with the ethical practice of law. 
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